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i 
Abstract 
 
 
A humiliating event can generate powerful emotions that can become part of a 
group’s identity. The need for vengeance can erupt into violence decades later, even 
across generations, especially in situations where physical force is associated with 
respect or status. Humiliation is a neglected area of the violence literature, yet has the 
power to turn insult into retribution, and indignation into fury. When humiliation 
takes the form of extreme degradation, then the resulting fury washes away the shame 
of helplessness.  I take the psychoanalytical theories of child development, social 
trauma, demonisation of the enemy and the entitlements of victimhood and show how 
they combine with humiliation to yield violence. Humiliation also interferes with the 
mourning process, making it difficult to come to terms with loss and leads to an 
obsession with the past events. Violence against a humiliator is usually paid back in 
the same currency, so a humiliated people will tend to humiliate their oppressors. 
Political leaders can manipulate this need for revenge, and if they have personal 
narcissistic tendencies will merge their personal need to avoid humiliation with that of 
society at large, potentially embarking on unnecessary conflicts. In societies where 
security or status relies on a reputation of toughness or a credible threat of violence, 
any potential challenge or insult must be confronted aggressively to avoid 
humiliation. 
 
These ideas are brought together in an analysis of Israeli Palestinian conflict in Gaza. 
Here two societies, each having undergone deep trauma and humiliation, remain 
locked in violent conflict. The thesis suggests that the daily humiliations of the people 
of Gaza helps to build a pool of resentful young men and women, and that this 
becomes a fertile recruitment ground for resistance organisations. Retaliation against 
aggression results in deeper humiliation and the cycle of violence continues. 
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Introduction 
 
“This fuel is dipped in humiliation. If their fuel means humiliation for us, 
we don’t want it”. Abu Ahmed of Islamic Jihad defends the deliberately 
targeted attack on the Israeli-controlled fuel depot on which Gazans 
depend.
1
 
 
Collective violent conflict is often explained in terms of relative strengths, cost-
benefit analysis, relative deprivation, resource stress or structural problems within 
society. The above quote shows that there are other forces at work. From the 
combatants’ point of view what is often at stake is national honour, the righting of 
historical wrongs, or revenge. By focussing the analysis on the emotional state of the 
participants, we can gain insights as to why it is that some conflicts, such as the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict, seem immune to rational analysis and resolution. It is not 
sufficient to analyse such conflicts solely in terms of economics, opportunism, 
alliances and other realpolitik concerns. A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained 
by a bloodless theory. 
 
In this thesis I argue that humiliation; the emotion associated with insulting or 
degrading treatment, lies at the heart of many violent conflicts. I explore the meaning 
of humiliation and analyse the extent to which humiliation and violence are linked. In 
order to do this, the following key questions are examined: 
• What is the nature of humiliation? 
• When do a humiliated people resort to violence? 
• Why do perpetrators of violence use humiliation as a weapon? 
• How do cultural factors affect the link between humiliation and violence? 
 
I start from the premise that humiliation and its accompanying need for revenge is an 
under-studied area of conflict analysis. As Thomas Friedman says “If I've learned one 
thing covering world affairs, it's this: The single most underappreciated force in 
international relations is humiliation”.
2
 Bringing together apparently disparate areas of 
research in psychology, sociology and some areas of political theory will contribute to 
                                                
1
 Caroline Pesce, "Israel Shuts Off Gaza's Fuel after Depot Attack," USA Today, 11 April 2008. 
2 Thomas L. Friedman, "The Humiliation Factor," The New York Times, 9 November 2003, 11. 
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my analysis. This is primarily a psychoanalytic theoretical framework for examining 
the role of humiliation in some types of group violence. 
 
Sources and Methodology 
 
When I began researching this topic in 2006, Evelin Lindner’s book, the first major 
work to cover humiliation and violence was published.
3
 She is the driving force 
behind the organisation Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, and their online 
journal, which, unfortunately, at the time of writing in 2009 appears to be dormant.
4
 
This organisation and her book concentrates on the social aspects of  humiliation with 
particular regard to globalisation. While appreciating that others were starting to 
understand the importance of humiliation, I wished to take a more psychoanalytical 
approach to examine the underlying forces at work. Consequently, my main sources 
come from the fields of psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Vamik Volkan is 
a professor of psychiatry with experience in ethnic violence, and I build on his ideas, 
along with those of John Mack, a psychoanalyst with an interest in political 
psychology. While I have not interviewed any perpetrators of violence, I do make use 
of those who have. Jerrold Post’s interest in political psychology led him to interview 
Middle Eastern terrorists. In a similar vein, James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, has spent 
many years interviewing the most violent prisoners in the US prison system. Jessica 
Stern, a US government advisor on terrorism, has produced an insightful book of her 
interviews with terrorists, which informed my study of the role of resistance 
organisations.
5
 
 
My research on cultural differences proved difficult. Since Ruth Benedict’s 
introduction of the concept of honour and shame cultures, there has been little recent 
writing on the subject.
6
 Anthropologist Raphael Patai had his book The Arab Mind 
republished in 2002,
7
 and the book is apparently used by the US military.
8
 Although 
                                                
3
 Evelin Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict (Westport CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006). 
4 See their website www.humiliationstudies.upeace.org/index.cfm. Accessed 26 August 2008 
5
 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God : Why Religious Militants Kill, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 
2003). 
6
 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (NY: A Mariner Book, 2005 (1946)). 
7 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, 2002 ed. (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 1976). 
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somewhat cavalier in its generalisations, it nevertheless provided some useful 
insights. David Pryce-Jones and Harold Glidden, orientalists from military and 
diplomatic backgrounds rather than academics, also provided some background 
material. James Bowman’s Honor
9
 provided insights into how the concept of honour 
has changed throughout the ages. The linkage between honour culture and reaction to 
insult has been established by the experiments of the social psychologists Richard 
Nesbitt and Dov Cohen, and by the psychologist Patricia Mosquera and her 
colleagues. I discuss these in the thesis. 
 
Friedman’s article, The Humiliation Factor, lead me to investigate the conflict on 
Gaza in terms of humiliation.
10
 While no source in particular concentrated on the 
emotional aspects of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, it was quite a straightforward 
process to extract this type of information from the many standard texts on the 
conflict, and from news sources. 
 
Main Themes 
 
There are a number of aspects of group violence that seem appropriate to a 
humiliation / revenge style of analysis. 
 
Firstly, realist and rationalist theories are limited in their ability to explain why 
military conflict involves mutilation, torture, mass indiscriminate killing, and 
targeting of civilians. The demonisation of the enemy is a complex process that allows 
and even entitles vicious and degrading treatment. I show how these atrocities can 
arise from a rage fuelled by humiliation and justified by demonising the enemy. 
 
Secondly, there has recently been a lot of interest in understanding the nature of non-
state terrorism. Evidence suggests that terrorists and even suicide bombers do not 
suffer from a pathological psychology.
11
 Nevertheless the build-up of daily 
                                                                                                                                       
8
 See a somewhat disparaging review in Brian Whitaker, Its Best Use Is as a Doorstop (guardian.co.uk,  
2004 [cited 24 August 2008]); available from 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/24/worlddispatch.usa. 
9
 James Bowman, Honor: A History (NY: Encounter Books, 2006). 
10
 Friedman, "The Humiliation Factor." 
11
 See for example Eric D Shaw, "Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the 
Psychopathology Model," International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 8, no. 3 (1986): 359-68. 
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humiliations, resentments and hopelessness helps provide a fruitful recruitment 
environment for extreme resistance organisations. 
 
Thirdly, as argued by Richard Nisbett, and others, there are identifiable cultural 
differences in the way people respond to insult.
 12
 Those who have strong codes of 
honour react forcefully to perceived insults, and unavenged insults are cause for 
shame and demand revenge. I argue that humiliation can lurk just beneath the surface 
in such societies, and confrontation is often the preferred mode of conflict resolution. 
 
Fourthly, a humiliation / revenge analysis may help to explain why some long-term 
conflicts seem intractable. The cycles of violence which are typical of these types of 
conflicts can sometimes be understood as a never-ending struggle to overcome a sense 
of helplessness or loss of self-esteem linked to humiliation. 
 
Humiliation as a driver for group violence is touched on by various researchers in 
sociology, psychology and the intelligence agencies, but is hardly mentioned by 
mainstream political theorists. There are only a few scholars who concern themselves 
with the social implications of humiliation. I build on psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan’s 
concept of the chosen trauma
13
 and psychoanalytical theories of child development, 
which are central to the discussion of the psychological underpinnings of ethnic 
humiliation and of demonisation of the enemy.
14
 Donald Nathanson’s compass of 
shame adds to the discussion at the level of the individual.
15
  
 
While Volkan’s contribution is extremely valuable, he is not concerned with cultural 
factors. If emotions play a significant part in violent conflict, then, in an increasingly 
interconnected world, how people from different cultures react emotionally becomes 
an extremely important part of conflict analysis and resolution. While various 
                                                
12
 See for example Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor. The Psychology of Violence in 
the South (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
13
 Vamik D. Volkan, "Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-
Group Identity," Group Analysis 34, no. 1 (2001): 79-97. 
14
 John Mack, "The Psychodynamics of Victimization among National Groups in Conflict," in The 
Psychodynamics of International Relationships Volume 1: Concepts and Theories, ed. Vamik D. 
Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, and Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 
119-30. 
15
 Donald L. Nathanson, Shame and Pride : Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self, 1st ed. (New York: 
Norton, 1992). 
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anthropologists have examined how respect and pride are maintained in different 
societies
16
, this has not been translated into discussions of how the reaction to 
humiliation, or the fear of humiliation, can lead to group violence. This thesis 
examines the links between humiliation and violence, and helps to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
 
I combine the psychodynamic theories of Volkan, Mack and others with a 
sociological view of how different types of societies have developed in regard to 
maintaining pride, dignity and self-respect and how, when this is under threat, 
violence can result. The case study brings these elements together to show how 
humiliation can contribute to violence within a particular cultural context.  I have 
chosen the situation in Gaza as it is well-documented and has two well-defined 
cultural groups which have each undergone trauma on a massive scale. Gaza provides 
an opportunity to explore how the humiliations of daily life can feed on past trauma to 
promote violence. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1. Theories of violence  
 
This first chapter examines a number of theories of violence. It is not intended as a 
comprehensive review, but rather I have chosen to examine some of the theories that 
may shed light on the situational, emotional and psychological factors of collective 
political violence. I cover a range of theories, with a brief look at how some have 
developed over time, including some well-known and other not so well-known 
theories. In this chapter the emphasis is on theories of how humiliation acts as a 
driving force for violent behaviour. In the next chapter I discuss in detail both the role 
of humiliation in instigating violence, and how that violence is expressed by 
humiliating others. 
 
I discuss the importance of differentiating between instrumental and expressive 
violence. Expressive violence which is an expression of an internal state rather than 
                                                
16
 See, for example, Julian Alfred Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in Honour and Shame: The 
Values of Mediterranean Society, ed. John G. Peristiany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). 
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goal-driven, is often an indicator of a strong emotional response, including rage and 
revenge. Very few theories of violence discuss the difference between expressive and 
instrumental violence and most have an often unstated assumption about the type of 
violence to which they are referring. 
 
As a theory of humiliation and violence posits both a degrading situation and an 
emotional reaction to that situation, I explore both the dispositional and situationist 
theories, looking for those ideas which help link the two perspectives. The 
situationists stress the importance of the social factors and attempt to demonstrate 
that, in extreme circumstances, even a normally peaceful group of people resorts to 
violence. The dispositional viewpoint stresses the innate tendency of  people to be 
aggressive, either through personality, upbringing, or emotional reactions. 
 
In order to explore the link between humiliation and collective violence, this chapter 
examines theories of violence, looking for those that have the following 
characteristics : 
1. They make a distinction between expressive and instrumental violence. 
2. They analyse how a situation can lead to an emotional reaction. 
3. The emotional or psychological state of the combatants plays a significant role 
in the violence. 
 
Such theories would form the basis of a more inclusive view of how humiliation is 
related to violence. 
Chapter 2. The power of humiliation 
 
The second chapter starts with a discussion and definition of some terms dealing with 
what is collectively called the negative emotions, including guilt and the various 
forms of shame. This clarification helps to avoid misunderstandings that can arise 
when discussing the literature on the topic coming from the differing but related 
disciplines of philosophy, sociology and psychology.  
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Specifically, humiliation is defined as the emotion associated with being treated in a 
disrespectful or degrading way by others, and in this context is always regarded as 
being undeserved.  
 
Human needs theorists, such as Abraham Maslow, regard self-esteem as a deep 
instinctual need.
17
 Humiliation cuts through self-esteem, and I show how rage and 
even running amok can be viewed as desperate measures to regain self-esteem. 
Nathanson’s compass of shame describes how shame associated with physical 
prowess is often associated with a violent response.
18
 
 
In this chapter I describe the psychoanalytic object-relations theory, developed by 
Heinz Kohut among others, and used by Volkan as the basis of his externalization 
theory.
19
 This theory states that an unintegrated sense of self during child 
development leads to ‘bad’ characteristics being projected onto other external objects 
or people. This can lead to the concept of an enemy with evil or even sub-human 
characteristics. It becomes easy to justify treating such people harshly – it’s the only 
treatment they understand. This leads to the need to humiliate, to treat the enemy as 
not worthy of human consideration and to conquer not only them but the evil they 
represent. 
 
Volkan also describes how when a group is under stress, or its identity is under threat, 
it can revert to a state of “magical thinking”, with simplistic notions of good and evil, 
and a strong emotional investment in cultural symbols.
20
 An historical trauma can 
become more salient, and old resentments and humiliations are relived and must be 
avenged. In such a state, violence is easily aroused. 
 
Finally, I compare the concept of unresolved personal mourning to that of group 
trauma, looking for the similarities. Perhaps it is possible to translate techniques for 
coping with personal loss to dealing with group trauma, and thus avert the violence 
which might result. 
                                                
17 See Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943). 
18
 Nathanson, Shame and Pride : Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self. 
19
 Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self. A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of 
Narcissistic Personality Disorders (London: The Hogarth Press, 1971). 
20 Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1988). 
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Chapter 3. The cultural dimension 
 
Discussing the emotions across different cultures is fraught with difficulties. Words 
are translated with variations in nuance, and similar words have different meanings. 
Ira Roseman’s appraisal theory provides us with a technique for discussing the 
emotions across cultures.
21
 It breaks down the emotional event into separate stages, 
allowing us to more carefully investigate the differences in cultural reactions. 
 
As an aid to exploring the cultural understanding of, and reaction to humiliation, I 
have adopted Richard Shweder’s social typologies.
22
 Those societies that emphasize 
values of the individual tend to promote autonomy. These values include liberty, 
human rights, equality, choice, separation of church and state and freedom of religion. 
By contrast, the values of the collective include obedience, sacrifice, group and family 
loyalty, courage, abstinence, and knowing one’s place in society. In most societies 
these two codes are in tension, with the values of the individual predominating in 
modern Western cultures, and the values of the collective tending to predominate 
within tribal and some Asian, Middle Eastern and African societies.  
 
The differences between collective honour societies and guilt-based individualistic 
societies are discussed in relation to how these societies react to insult. Collective 
honour societies place great importance on group loyalty, and the need for the group 
to defend itself and be respected. The development of honour societies is discussed in 
terms of survival in an environment where state control is weak, and economic assets 
are easily stolen. In such circumstances, a reputation for toughness is the basis for 
safety and security of the family, clan or tribe. This reputation is built by responding 
aggressively to any perceived threat or insult. 
 
This leads me to a new concept, that of a ‘security-based’ society, where the prime 
concern is safety and security. This becomes necessary to explain how in anarchic 
                                                
21 Ira Roseman et al., "Cultural Differences and Cross-Cultural Similarities in Appraisals and 
Emotional Responses," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26, no. 1 (1995). 
22
 Richard Shweder et al., "The "Big Three" Of Morality (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and The 
"Big Three" Explanations of Suffering," in Morality and Health, ed. A Brandt and P Rozin (NY: 
Routledge, 1997). 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Introduction 
9 of 118 
societies where there is little tradition of group loyalty, such as America’s ‘wild west’, 
and some street drug culture, there is a strong need to appear fierce, and to respond 
swiftly to any perceived challenge. In situations where safety and security are 
paramount concerns, this don’t mess with me attitude tends to override the natural 
tendencies of collective or individualist cultures. 
 
After discussing nomadic tribal society, I focus on discussing the Arab world, and 
show how ihtaram, the ability to dominate others, and one of three pillars of prestige 
(along with generosity and hospitality, and the purity of the female members of the 
family), can lead to a strong response to perceived insult.
23
 Some parts of the Arab 
world can be seen as examples of an honour society, which are occasionally combined 
with elements of a security culture when state control is weak. 
 
I include a historical perspective showing how elite European society has moved 
away from an honour code of chivalry and dueling towards a more individualistic 
society that became widespread especially in North America and Northern Europe. So 
much so that few Western diplomats talk in terms of honour, glory or insult, but use 
less emotive words like prestige and status. However, politicians and the media still 
use such terms to build support for the defence or promotion of national values. 
 
But there are still large regional differences within the Western world. I look at 
Nisbett and Cohen’s comprehensive study comparing attitudes and behaviour relating 
to insult between the northern and southern states of America.
24
 They describe a 
relationship between violence, gun ownership and honour culture in the American 
South. 
 
Similarly, Mosquera’s study shows how Spaniards and the Dutch behave significantly 
differently in interpreting and reacting to behaviour as confronting or insulting, and he 
                                                
23 Victoria Fontan, "Polarization between Occupier and Occupied in  Post-Saddam Iraq: Colonial 
Humiliation and the Formation of Political Violence," Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 
(2006)., Patai, The Arab Mind. And Harold W Glidden, "The Arab World," American Journal of 
Psychiatry 128, no. 8 (1972). 
24 Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor. The Psychology of Violence in the South. 
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relates this to deep cultural differences.
25
 Both these studies showed an increasing 
likelihood of anger for the more honour based societies 
 
I propose some reasons as to why within individualistic societies insults are not so 
threatening to self-esteem. I introduce the concept of a status group – that group of 
people whose opinion matters. In diverse societies people are likely to have many 
such groups, so loss of status in one group is not so crucial to personal self-esteem. 
Honour societies tend to have a less diverse civic society, so status loss is more 
potentially damaging, and in extreme cases can lead to social abandonment or even 
expulsion. 
Chapter 4. The Gaza case study. 
 
The situation in Gaza brings together many of the theoretical elements discussed so 
far. It combines trauma theory, demonisation of the enemy, the entitlement that comes 
with victimhood, and the cultural imperatives of an honour society that feels unable to 
protect itself. Both Jews and Palestinians have undergone trauma, each side 
demonises the other, and each side believes it is the victim in the conflict. I discuss 
how victimhood, and its associated entitlements, affect both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, and how it derives from each side’s social trauma. The trauma of 
expulsion has become part of the Palestinian identity, and there is an obsession with 
righting this wrong. Similarly the trauma and deep humiliation of the Holocaust still 
repercusses through Israeli thinking and policy. 
 
In part, the discussion is placed within the historical context of the conflict to get a 
sense of its long-term nature. Humiliation plays a role in the daily life of the “open 
prison”
 26
 of Gaza, and I discuss how this provides the resistance organizations, 
especially Hamas, with a fertile recruiting ground.  Hamas provides an emotional and 
psychological lifeline to the disaffected youth of Gaza who have no livelihood, no 
future, and live in despair. It provides an ideology, a purpose and the self-esteem of 
                                                
25
 P Mosquera, A Manstead, and A Fischer, "The Role of Honor-Related Values in the Elicitation, 
Experience, and Communication of Pride, Shame and Anger: Spain and the Netherlands Compared," 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26, no. 9 (2000). 
26
 Aleem Maqbool, "Life in the 'Open Prison' of Gaza," BBC News, 15 March 2008. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7296750.stm accessed 4th May 
2008) 
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being part of a grand social enterprise, supported through provision of employment, 
welfare and leadership. 
 
The conflict suffers from a cycle of violence in which the role of humiliation plays a 
significant role. The daily humiliations of living under occupation lead to anger, 
resentment, frustration and ultimately revenge. When resistance organizations provide 
the means for revenge, the resulting attacks on Israel are met with harsh reprisals, 
which increase the sense of helplessness, anger and humiliation, and the cycle 
continues. . . 
Conclusion 
 
The conclusion brings together the psychological and cultural aspects of humiliation 
to form a model of how humiliation acts as a catalyst for violence. The model presents 
a set of factors that helps determine if humiliation plays a significant role in collective 
political violence. Not only does being humiliated increase the likelihood of a violent 
response, but it also increases the likelihood that the violence will be in the form of 
humiliating the enemy. The Gaza study shows how a deep pool of resentment can be 
used as a fertile recruitment ground for an active violent resistance. 
 
The implications are clear. Humiliating an enemy may have a short term advantage in 
demoralising resistance. In the longer term leaders need to be aware that particularly 
within some cultures, unavenged humiliation is a powerful driving force that can lead 
to emotionally-driven conflicts that can emerge years, even decades, after the event.
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Chapter 1: Theories of violence 
 
The purpose of this brief review of theories of collective political violence is to 
examine how they can help in understanding the role of humiliation. In this chapter I 
consider those theories that help explain how humiliation drives violence. 
  
Humiliation is an emotional response to a degrading situation. In this review I 
examine theories of violence that are concerned with emotional or psychological 
factors of economic or political situations. This focus explains why I have not 
included many significant theories of why states go to war, but have included some 
less well-known sociological theories. There is a comparatively small number of  
theorists who examine systematically the emotions of pride, fear, resentment, hatred, 
shame and humiliation and the part they play in causing violence. 
 
It is useful to differentiate between two types of violence: that which has a goal, 
instrumental violence, and that which appears to be primarily concerned with 
inflicting injury for its own sake. Violence is instrumental when it is used to achieve 
some goal beyond the violence itself. Such goals include taking control over 
resources, overthrow of regimes, defence of territory, maintaining public order or 
establishment of political control through fear. This is the type of violence that 
political theories of warfare tend to consider. They look at resource pressures, military 
strength, rational choice, national prestige and international structures. While they 
provide insights into the causes of war, their limited view of the role of the emotions 
means they are not so relevant to a discussion of the role of humiliation. 
 
Leonard Berkowitz has named the violence where the prime purpose is to cause injury 
as “emotional”.
27
 I prefer the term “expressive”, as some instrumental violence can 
arise from the emotions, for instance fears about security can lead to a pre-emptive 
attack. “Expressive” also emphasises that the violence is a reflection of an internal 
state rather than being “for” something. Lashing out, vengeance, and extreme hatred 
fall into this category. It is the violence born of frustration, resentment, ancient 
                                                
27
 Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression : Its Causes, Consequences, and Control, Mcgraw-Hill Series in 
Social Psychology. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 11. 
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hatreds or insult. The angry mob that burns its own neighbourhood is displaying 
expressive violence. Violence associated with humiliation is emotion-driven and has a 
strong expressive component, so any theory that includes humiliation needs to 
differentiate between instrumental and expressive violence. It is difficult to reconcile 
bloody violence and atrocities with rational and bloodless explanations 
 
However, violence is a complex phenomenon and does not easily succumb to a simple 
typology. Almost all violence contains elements of both an instrumental and 
expressive variety. It could be argued that expressive violence has as its goal the 
satisfaction of  emotional urges, and as such has an instrumental aspect. I argue later 
that some forms of expressive violence have a specific but often unconscious goal of 
restoring a sense of self-esteem. In fact, it is the main argument of this thesis that 
violence born out of humiliation can be usefully analysed as a (usually unconscious) 
strategy to restore pride. Many forms of instrumental violence have an underlying 
expressive aspect. In addition, there are often different individual motivations for the 
violence within the group itself. Lindner introduces the phrase “entrepreneurs of 
humiliation” for those who harness the frustrations of others for their own violent 
enterprise.
28
 Similarly, from Jessica Stern, “Leaders harness humiliation and anomie 
and turn them into weapons”.
29
 Furthermore, what starts out as instrumental violence 
can easily slide into expressive aggression. For example, a defensive attack to degrade 
an enemy’s capability can easily take on the cruel and out-of-control characteristics of 
expressive violence. It is not uncommon for soldiers to savagely avenge the death of 
their comrades.
30
 The phrase “unleashing the dogs of war”
31
 acknowledges the 
difficulties of restricting violence within defined goals. 
 
Theories that stress the instrumental approach claim that groups are aware of violence 
as a technique for gaining political ends, and weigh up the possibilities of success in 
its use. There is a type of cost-benefit analysis at work. Rationalist theory talks about 
                                                
28
 Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict. 
29 Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003): 28. 
30
See for example Josh White, "Report on Haditha Condemns Marines," Washington Post, 21 April 
2007. 
31
 Actually a misquote from William Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 1. “Cry ‘Havoc’ 
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weighing up the benefits of various courses of action, and Charles Tilly especially 
claims that violence is a tactical choice for political ends.
32
 
 
The rationalist approach suffers from some well-known problems at the level of the 
individual. Firstly, there is the free-rider problem. If individuals assume that they 
personally would be unlikely to make a significant difference to the success of a 
violent enterprise, why should they expose themselves to the risks of violence when 
they would gain the benefits of the group’s success anyway? Secondly the risks of 
serious injury, torture or death in a violent encounter are usually highly uncertain, 
making it impossible to rationally assess the risks and benefits of taking part. 
 
There is another complication to this instrumental and expressive typology. Albert 
Bandura believes that to admit to ourselves that we are acting irrationally out of anger 
or frustration or fear can feel demeaning, as if we are not in control of our actions. So 
we rationalise, and put an instrumental gloss on our behaviour. As he states “What is 
culpable can be made righteous through cognitive reconstrual”.
33
 Responding to insult 
becomes protecting our reputation. Revenge becomes retaliation and places it within 
the moral context of retributive justice. For the group retaliated against to regard the 
retaliation as balancing out the scales of violence would be to suggest that their initial 
attack was unjustified, which would be socially and psychologically difficult. So the 
group that is retaliated against will most likely see this as a new offence, itself 
requiring retaliation, and the cycle of violence continues. Retaliation has the 
underlying ethic of deterrence, to “teach them a lesson”, to show them it isn’t a good 
idea to attack. This belief is often difficult to reconcile with the empirical evidence 
that attack is most usually seen as provocation.
34
 
 
There are many ways that groups can be violent while attempting to maintain or alter 
the power structure: warfare between states, violent protest demonstrations, terrorist 
attacks, ethnic riots, liberation movements, coups, state oppression of a minority, 
genocide, gang assaults targeting particular groups, ethnic cleansing, religious 
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persecution, and there are many more. These violent episodes vary in a number of 
ways. Some are likely to be lethal, others only involve damage to property. Some 
simmer for years, others are one-off events. Some events, such as feuds, are defined 
by strict rules of engagement. Some involve the forces of the state, others do not. The 
participants can be professional soldiers, mercenaries, volunteer armies, occasional 
fighters, tribal warriors, untrained terrorists, renegade soldiers, private armies or an 
angry mob. Wars are carefully planned, with strategies, supply chains and troop 
movements, while riots can be uncoordinated, spontaneous and leaderless. 
 
Collective violence is not a single phenomenon. The question should not be what 
causes collective violence, but in what particular circumstances do different types of 
violence occur? It is unreasonable to expect that a single theory of collective violence 
could explain such a diverse range of behaviours with so many variables. For a theory 
of violence to be useful either to gain insights into violent behaviour or as a predictive 
tool, it would need to consider such variables as goals, timing, targeting, severity, 
duration, organisation, scale, and effectiveness. Given the scale of such a task, it 
would seem more fruitful to build a theory pertinent to the conditions surrounding 
specific types of violent episodes. This would also make such a set of theories more 
capable of targeted empirical testing. An overarching theory of the causes of violence 
would have to consider a street riot a similar phenomenon to the invasion of a foreign 
country. A multi-theory approach could describe the conditions and causes of a local 
riot in different terms from that of  warfare between states.  
 
While acknowledging the need for a range of theories, it may still be possible to 
highlight some common psychological processes that operate in different conditions 
to produce a variety of types of group violence. In fact, later in this thesis I show how 
humiliation can lead both to personal violence and state-wide conflicts. Within this 
chapter I review existing theories of violence to see how they can contribute to an 
understanding of the role humiliation plays in violence. 
 
When analysing theories of violence it is important to be aware of the often hidden 
assumptions as to the nature of the violent episodes being presented. An angry mob is 
not always behaving irrationally, and a war is not always driven solely by perceived 
national interests. 
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The expressive – instrumental dimension is a way of classifying types of violence, 
whether it achieves a political or sociological purpose, or whether it expresses an 
inner turmoil. It is also possible to categorise theories by where they look for the 
underlying causes of violence. The dispositional approach looks for causes within the 
individual and concentrates on personality, upbringing, crowd psychology, emotional 
reactions, and innate tendencies. The situationist approach takes the opposite view. 
Circumstances are crucial, not just extenuating and in the background, and can help 
explain how it is that apparently peaceful people can behave violently and sadistically. 
It is the situation itself that is toxic, that causes the behaviour, and is largely 
independent of the motivations or predispositions of the people involved. However, 
while the situationist approach can lead us to look closely at certain types of social 
and political factors as precursors to violence, there still remains the fact that some 
people are more prone to violence than others in the same situation. This implies that 
there is a dispositional as well as a situationist effect at work.  I examine some 
theories along this dispositional – situationist spectrum to see how they shed light on 
the role of humiliation. 
 
Even though the focus of this study is violence committed by groups of people, it is 
reasonable to posit that group behaviour requires a coming together of individual 
drives and motivations expressed through and focussed by the group. Therefore I 
consider some relevant theories of violence that operate at the level of the individual 
as well as theories of group violence. 
 
Dispositional view of violence 
Innate Aggression 
 
As individuals, are we innately aggressive? The founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund 
Freud came to believe that countering the lust for life (libido) is a death instinct that 
craves the removal of stimulation, tension and excitement.
35
 Although this should 
logically lead to suicide, the life force channels this destructive urge outwards to 
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others, and aggression becomes a satisfying need, or as he states in Civilisation and its 
Discontents, “Men are not gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply 
defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire for 
aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment”.
36
 Freud did not 
greatly elaborate on these concepts, and it is difficult to see how such ideas can help 
us explain under what circumstances aggression and violence are likely to be 
expressed, and at what intensity. The concept of aggressive drives that well up 
internally and have to be expressed leads to the idea of catharsis, where negative 
emotions are allowed to “let off steam” in a safe environment and become depleted. 
However, various studies have subsequently found that expressing hostility is usually 
associated with further aggression, thus disputing this “pressure-cooker” view of 
aggressive impulses.
37
 The concept of aggressive drives without a now-disputed 
theory of catharsis becomes simply an unwarranted elevation of a description (people 
are aggressive) into an explanatory theory (people have an aggressive instinct). 
Without a description of how this innate aggression is aroused, or how it is linked to 
insult or a feeling of being devalued, the theory does not offer much directly to a 
discussion about the role of humiliation. It is included here, as the concept of an 
aggressive instinct helps to lay the foundation for the development of the dispositional 
view of aggression. 
 
For different reasons, the ethologist Konrad Lorenz also posits that aggression is 
innate, and in his view can be described as an evolutionary imperative. In his book On 
Aggression, he developed the thesis that we can gain greater understanding of 
aggressive human behaviour by extrapolating from animal behaviour in the natural 
habitat.
38
 His view was that much innate behaviour is a reflection of evolutionary 
processes and is programmed through the generations. Aggression in animals is 
driven by the need to preserve the species from over-population, defending the young, 
survival of the fittest, defence of territory and the establishment of stable pecking 
orders. However, as Greg Cashman points out, the extrapolation from animal species 
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to humans is not satisfactorily described or explained.
39
 And again, this theory does 
not explain in what circumstances this “innate aggression” is expressed. 
The angry crowd 
 
Gustave Le Bon, a contemporary of Freud, considered the dynamics of crowd 
psychology and describes an attitude towards the masses where individuality is 
subsumed into a crowd identity, rationality is lost, instincts prevail and violence 
erupts.
40
 According to Le Bon, individuals in crowds behave psychotically
41
. Freud 
agrees, and compares Le Bon’s characterisation of a crowd to a stage of child 
development with elements of hypnotic fascination and neurosis.
42
 Freud believes that 
the members of a group project their ego-ideal onto their leader, and this sharing leads 
to an immediate sense of intimacy between members of the group. With the ego now 
relieved of moral constraints, a more primitive response built on basic drives 
unhampered by a sense of responsibility can now be stimulated and directed by the 
leader, the mob’s source of moral authority. Freud sees a regressive mob as being 
driven by primitive forces such as excitement and rage. Under such a theory, a crowd 
would be more susceptible to expressing moral outrage as violence against unjust 
institutions, or their proxies. Such theories of crowd behaviour mesh with Milgram’s 
concept (discussed later) of individuals allowing their own sense of responsibility to 
be overridden by an external moral authority. A mob can feel less socially inhibited 
about committing violence if it believes that it has been given authority to avenge 
injustice. This also echoes Zimbardo’s thesis (see later) that the personal anonymity 
experienced within the mob, and violence sanctioned by an external moral authority, 
will likely promote sadistic behaviour.  
 
While being aware that mobs can be aroused to revenge injustices, we should be 
mindful that angry crowds are not always as emotionally driven as Le Bon would 
have us believe. Horowitz has produced one of the most comprehensive accounts of 
crowds behaving destructively, and it is clear from his portrayal that although a riot is 
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usually driven by passion, there are also many rational elements at play.
43
 For 
example, the rioters often take special care to ensure their victims are correctly 
identified (no false positives), and that there is reduced risk to the rioters themselves. 
To quote Horowitz : “the riot is not an unstructured frenzy, made possible by a gap in 
public order”.
44
  
The Narcissistic Personality 
 
Freud’s theory of the narcissistic personality sheds some light on the role of 
humiliation in violent behaviour. Freud introduced the psychological concept of 
narcissism in his 1914 essay “On Narcissism – an Introduction”.
45
 According to his 
theory, self-love is the basis for self-esteem, and helps to overcome the normal 
psychological difficulties of growing up.  Narcissism is where the self-love becomes 
obsessive.
46
 The obsession can develop when a difficult childhood results in an 
intense need for love coupled with a fear of rejection.
47
 This type of narcissistic 
personality is preoccupied with fame and success and is in constant need of the 
approval of others. For such individuals, any undermining of their status requires 
immediate retaliation and as they have little empathy for the feelings of others, they 
can be ruthless. For the extremely narcissistic individual, the removal of the 
approving mirror of follower adulation is tantamount to humiliation. Acting 
aggressively converts this sense of helplessness to mastery, thereby regaining lost 
self-esteem.
48
 
 
Jerrold Post describes what he calls the malignant narcissist, an extremely dangerous 
variant of this personality type. Such a person has four characteristics: 
1. Extreme grandiosity and self-absorption with no capacity to empathise with 
pain or suffering of others 
2. Defective social conscience 
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3. The unconstrained use of aggression in the service of his or her own needs 
4. An extremely paranoid outlook, suspicious (usually with good reason) and 
ready for betrayal.
 49
 
Two examples of political leaders that fit this profile are Stalin and Saddam 
Hussein.
50
 
 
When extremely narcissistic individuals are driven enough to become successful 
politicians, this personality trait affects how they respond to political events. The link 
between humiliation and violence has at least two dimensions for the narcissistic 
leader: 
1. The need to be perceived as powerful overrides any sense of national interest. 
In a sense, the need for the leader to appear powerful becomes the national 
interest in the psyche of such a leader. 
2. A grandiose leader automatically assumes that victory is inevitable in any 
political or military adventure, and regards any advice to the contrary as 
insulting and demeaning. There is a strong need for close advisors to feed the 
ego of the leader, and those that fail in this respect are removed. 
 
For example, Blema Steinberg describes Nixon’s reaction to the communist incursion 
into South Vietnam. He thought it “was a deliberate test, clearly designed to take the 
measure of me and my administration at the outset. My immediate instinct was to 
retaliate”.
51
 The personal and the national become intertwined. 
 
The tendency of strongly narcissistic leaders to conflate the national interest with their 
own psychological needs, and to ignore or refute information or advice that 
contradicts their view of the world makes such individuals exceedingly dangerous. 
They demand to be heard but refuse to listen. While such leaders often emerge in 
times of crisis, as they can offer a strong sense of moral certainty in troubled times, 
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such a potentially aggressive personality is not best suited to defusing volatile 
situations.
52
 
 
Such an analysis helps to understand how individual narcissistic leaders behave in 
order to avoid what they see as the ever-present danger of humiliation. Also such 
leaders often have powerful personalities that can appeal to the population at large. 
The followers can sense that their leader is driven by the need for esteem, and can 
relate to his calls for the restoration of former glory, or revenge for a previous defeat. 
As the leader conflates his own psychological needs with that of the state as a whole, 
the group can act out the psychological drama of its grandiose leader.  
Critique of the dispositional view 
 
Those that hold the view that aggression is an innate human drive or instinct have a 
larger question to answer. Why is it that the huge majority of human beings live in 
peace for most of their lives? Most people find it difficult to kill or inflict suffering on 
others. For example, MacNair reports that S.L.A. Marshall found that only 15% to 
20% of soldiers actually fired their guns at an exposed enemy in World War II, and 
that Grossman reviewed such data in other wars to conclude that soldiers have to be 
thoroughly trained to overcome an innate psychological resistance to killing.
53
 It 
seems that more are prepared to die for their country than to kill for it. The evidence 
appears to suggest that if aggression is instinctual, then its opposite, the desire to 
cooperate peacefully must also be present, and often gains the upper hand. Therefore 
the view that humans are innately aggressive does not in itself explain individual 
violent episodes. If we cannot explain aggression simply as an innate part of human 
nature, then we are compelled to look deeper. It is my contention that the emotional 
responses to how we are treated by others is an important factor in producing violent 
behaviour, and this is explored throughout this thesis. 
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Situationist view of violence 
 
The situationist view has developed along two theoretical strands. The first was based 
on the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis, in which violence was deemed the result of 
a denial of aspirations or expectations. The second grew from the work of Milgram, 
who was trying to understand why the Nazis in the Second World War behaved 
sadistically, and from Zimbardo and his prison experiment, where the social dynamics 
of the environment promoted violence. The following sections outline some of these 
situationist theories, observations and experiments. 
The Frustration-Aggression hypothesis 
 
John Dollard’s famous theory in his book Frustration and Aggression states that 
every aggressive act could ultimately be traced to a previous frustration.
54
 Dollard 
defined frustration as the denial of satisfactions when the person was expecting them, 
and aggression as the intention to cause injury. This is a direct example of a 
situationist perspective, as the nature of the individual concerned is considered 
secondary to the situation. The theory has been very influential, and has lead to a large 
number of experimental investigations.
55
 Many of these experiments have been 
concerned with the nature of the expectation and its denial.  
 
For a comprehensive appraisal of the state of Frustration-Aggression theory, see 
Berkowitz.
56
 While the theory is useful in examining causes of violence, its 
limitations are reasonably apparent. It is evident that not all thwarting leads to 
aggressive behaviour, due to many personal and cultural factors. Also, aggression can 
be caused by a number of factors apart from frustration: insult, security fears or even 
greed, for example. James Gilligan quotes from a review of the frustration literature: 
 
Curiously, when psychologists have tried to produce anger in the 
laboratory, even when they have written about their results in terms of the 
consequences of frustration, they have not relied much on frustrating 
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people but have much more commonly insulted people – possibly 
because it is very difficult to make adults angry by frustrating them.
57
 
 
At the heart of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is the concept of a denial of an 
expected goal. While Dollard et al were quite specific in defining frustration as a set 
of external events (the denial of an outcome) rather than the emotional reaction to 
such events, this is most likely the result of the stimulus-response orientation of 
behavioural psychology at the time rather than a denial of the role of the emotions per 
se.  
 
How does the frustration-aggression theory relate to humiliation? It is difficult to 
relate a “hopes dashed” form of frustration, where an expected improvement in the 
situation is denied, with humiliation, the emotion associated with degrading treatment. 
However, if the concept of frustration is extended to include any expected pleasant 
outcome, rather than only those associated with improvement, then the denial of 
decent and respectful treatment does fit within the frustration-aggression theory. The 
concept of ‘expectation’ is more complex than it seems at first. We might expect to be 
treated civilly within society at large, yet at the same time know that it is unlikely. 
And yet we can still feel the frustration from the generalised expectation without 
being surprised at an individual instance of disrespect. This suggests that the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis can hold even when a yearning for decent treatment 
is known to be an unrealistic expectation.  
 
This interpretation of frustration as denial of respectful treatment fits with the concept 
of being devalued experienced as humiliation. Thus the frustration-aggression theory 
has some relevance in examining the role of humiliation as a precursor to violence. 
Relative deprivation theory 
 
Some theorists argue that the structure of a society produces frustrations and helps 
determine whether violence will erupt. Some concentrate on mass uprisings or 
revolutions, others on more general grievances between different sections of society.  
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Relative deprivation theory concentrates on the gap between expectations and 
realities, which is almost a definition of frustration. It claims that when people’s 
expectations are thwarted they tend to rebel. This can be regarded as a collective 
version of Dollard’s frustration-aggression theory. 
 
Gurr describes various patterns of relative deprivation.
58
 Decremental relative 
deprivation is the loss of what was previously enjoyed or anticipated. Rebellions when 
economic conditions collapse are examples of this. The Russian sacrifices during 
World War I provided the deprivation as the basic ingredient for the Russian 
Revolution. Aspirational relative deprivation occurs when aspirations increase while 
conditions of normal life remain constant. Unfulfilled promises of changes for the 
better can lead to violent protest. Progressive relative deprivation is the combination 
of the other two: increase of expectations accompanied by a decrease in quality of life. 
A short period of sharp reversal after a long period of social development can cause 
fears of losing overnight what has been gained over a long period. As humiliation can 
be described in terms of the denial of the esteem or status that one is due, it fits within 
deprivation theory. The theory supports the concept that the frustration of not being 
treated as expected can lead to violence. The difference however, is that relative 
deprivation focuses on material deprivation, rather than the emotional sense of 
degradation..  
 
Relative deprivation theory is mainly concerned with economics and politics, and not 
directly concerned with the loss of self-esteem. Violence is analysed in these theories 
as primarily an instrumental remedy against unjust distribution of resources. I would 
argue that considering the humiliating aspects of relative deprivation would 
strengthen deprivation theory and also help explain expressive elements of the 
resulting violence.  
Galtung’s structural theory of aggression 
 
Galtung believes that violence is most likely when the complete underdog becomes 
capable of gaining some physical or emotional resources that provide assistance in 
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aggressively pursuing change.
59
 This is a generalisation of Gurr’s relative deprivation 
theory as it includes emotional as well as material resources. Galtung’s theory 
emphasises that a deprived group will promote its cause once it has some other 
resources available to it.. Galtung is concerned with status disequilibrium. When a 
group has a high ranking in some realm, but is low in another, then this increases the 
possibility of aggression and possibly violence. This possibility increases if the 
mobility in that realm is blocked, and the group has a predisposition for aggression. 
For clarity of argument he takes the case of there being just two rankings, topdog (T) 
and underdog (U). If there are, say, three criteria; for example wealth, power and 
status, then a topdog group could be expressed as TTT, and the underdog group as 
UUU. He theorises that a UUU group has no choice but to accept its plight. However, 
if the underdog group becomes wealthy TUU, then its status disequilibrium 
encourages aggression through resentment at being denied power and status, with the 
TTT group more likely to become a reference group for the underdog. A complete 
underdog group has no physical, psychological, ideological or informational resources 
to draw on. But what makes a criterion relevant for this theory? It could be the area of 
land, resources, per capita income, military might, control of the bureaucracy, level of 
education, access to employment or some other measure. Galtung is well aware of the 
difficulty in choosing relevant criteria.
60
 The areas of relevance are to some extent 
likely to be made clear by the nature of the grievance spelt out by the aggressive 
group, such as an educated work force with no access to jobs, or an emerging power 
not being treated with respect. The theory has some practical application in reminding 
those who wish to raise up underdog groups of the dangers of one-sided development, 
such as increasing education without provision for job creation. 
 
Although this theory has some explanatory power, it does not differentiate between 
instrumental and expressive violence. It touches on the themes of resentment, and so 
may be relevant to humiliation. However, it is a general theory based on social 
structure, and it does not elaborate on the processes that lead from status 
disequilibrium to violence. 
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Human Needs theories 
 
Human needs theory specifies those needs that we are prepared to fight for. Maslow 
outlines a hierarchy of basic needs that he believes are common across humanity.
61
 
The most basic are the physiological needs of hunger, shelter and warmth (“all I want 
is a room somewhere”) followed by safety and security. Once these have been to 
some extent satisfied, the need for love, or belonging, becomes dominant. Human 
needs theorist John Burton includes the need for a sense of identity under this 
heading, followed by the need for self-esteem and the esteem of others.
62
 The final 
basic need to arise is for self-actualisation, or the need to fulfil potential. While 
Maslow posited that these needs must be satisfied in a specific order, others have 
argued that the order can be reversed; for example some may strive for esteem before 
acceptance, as either they value respect more than love, or they see respect as a means 
to becoming accepted by the larger community. 
 
Burton classifies human motivations into three broad types: needs that are universal, 
values that are cultural, and interests that are transitory.
63
 Needs are an immutable and 
integral part of being human, and cannot be compromised or denied without a fierce 
struggle. According to Burton, violence is the natural reaction to placing these needs 
under threat.  
 
Values are the beliefs, habits and customs that help define different cultures, and can 
change slowly over time. The set of values that are part of a culture also are a part of 
the individual’s identity, and for this reason a threat to them also threatens the more 
basic needs of the group. Defence of values can elicit extreme measures, and many a 
war has been fought over core beliefs. Values are not generally perceived as  
negotiable as they define the identity of the group or individual, even though they may 
evolve over time. 
 
Interests are negotiable, according to Burton, and conflicts of interest can often be 
resolved through a give and take compromise. The danger is that in order to 
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strengthen a claim, interests are upgraded to questions of values and beliefs, which 
makes compromise more difficult. 
 
Human needs theory helps explain why humiliation expressed as a loss of self-esteem 
is so powerful as a motivator for violence. While the theory implies that a violent 
response would be an instrumental act (to stop degrading behaviour by others), it also 
includes the cases of violence as an expressive act that helps the perpetrator feel he or 
she has some power over the situation. The priority that self-esteem takes in various 
cultures helps determine the strength of the reaction. This is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3 on cultural differences. 
 Social dynamics 
 
Having explored some theories of violence which are variants of how frustration can 
contribute to aggressive behaviour, I now examine the effect of the social situation 
and how  obedience and permission to behave sadistically affect behaviour. 
 
There are a number of experiments, observations and recorded violent episodes in 
which ordinary people with no obvious violent tendencies behave sadistically. These 
include the Stanley Milgram experiments
64
, Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford prison 
experiment
65
, and Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the banality of evil.
66
 An extreme 
example is the case in Nazi Germany, where the mass murder of 38,000 Jews in four 
months in remote Polish villages was carried out by elderly family men recruited for 
the job.
67
 These men were too old to be drafted, and had no military training. They 
were just ordinary men, but they had official encouragement to act brutishly against 
those labelled as enemies. 
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The Milgram experiments 
 
The experiments of Stanley Milgram proved that the destructive power of obedience 
was greater than many psychologists of the day thought possible.
68
 The mere fact of 
being told to continue administering shocks was enough to compel 26 of 40 subjects 
to apply shocks marked as ‘intense’ to human subjects in Milgram’s first experiment. 
Milgram’s theory is that it is the nature of authority that caused the violence, not an 
innate desire to cause suffering.
69
 All of the subjects showed signs of intense stress 
and there was clearly no desire to inflict pain, yet 26 subjects obeyed their orders to 
inflict maximum shocks. Milgram believes the nature of authority plays two distinct 
roles.  
 
1. Authority defines reality and its meaning. A legitimate and expert authority 
can define what is important and what should be ignored. If that authority 
states that suffering is secondary to other goals, then that becomes the reality. 
 
2. An  individual feels responsible to an authority that he or she respects, and this 
overrides personal responsibility for his or her own actions.  
 
In a variation of the experiment, a faked rebellion in front of the subjects led to a 
dramatic drop in obedience; an alternative definition of priorities diminished the 
power of authority. There are other situations in which there are dramatic falls in the 
obedience rate. As Bandura points out about other variants of the experiment: 
 
what is rarely noted is the equally striking evidence that most people steadfastly 
refuse to behave punitively, even in response to incessant authoritarian 
commands, if the situation is personalised by having them see their victim or 
requiring them to inflict pain directly rather than remotely.
70
 
 
While Milgram’s experiments are not specifically related to humiliation as a precursor 
to aggression, they do show that the situation itself can promote aggression. The 
importance of this is expanded later. 
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Zimbardo’s prison experiment71 
 
In 1971, 24 students of Stanford university underwent an experiment involving role-
playing in a realistic prison setting. They were selected as being ‘normal and healthy 
in every respect’.
72
 Half were randomly assigned to be prison guards, and half as 
prisoners. The experiment was due to last two weeks, but was abandoned after only 
six days. Some prisoners suffered emotional breakdown due to the sadistic treatment 
by the guards. Zimbardo himself started behaving like a prison administrator rather 
than a researcher.  As a psychological experiment it became out of control, and was 
closed down. 
 
The personality tests administered before the start of the experiment showed no 
discernible difference in the least and most abusive of the guards. Thus Zimbardo 
believes it was the social dynamics of the situation that encouraged abusive behaviour 
rather than psychological tendencies. There was some correlation for the prisoners 
between authoritarian attitudes and the ability to cope with the abuse of the guards. 
 
Zimbardo attributes the generated sadistic behaviour of the guards to two main 
factors: 
1. Anonymity. Prisoners were shaved, and given numbers. Guards wore 
sunglasses and uniforms to enhance anonymity. 
2. Implied sanction. The institution of a prison gave guards the permission to 
control others. 
 
Bandura’s discussion of moral disengagement helps explain how the situation became 
so sadistic. 
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Moral disengagement 
 
Albert Bandura discusses how disengagement of moral inhibitions can be used to 
allow or even justify aggressive and inhumane behaviour.
73
 This disengagement is an 
essential part of theories of violence that emphasise the affect of the social 
environment. When aggressive behaviour is construed as serving a valued social or 
moral purpose then the behaviour becomes justified. Punishing behaviour to act as a 
deterrent, to “teach them a lesson” can be almost a moral imperative.  And in so-
called honour societies violence can be seen as valuable in terms of protecting 
reputation.
74
 Depersonalising the aggressive encounter by distancing from the 
suffering also disengages moral inhibitions. It is psychologically easier to kill by 
dropping a bomb than by facing your enemy with a handgun. Euphemistic language 
can disguise or lessen the moral implications of violence. Examples are “collateral 
damage”, or the use of “casualties” to include both fatalities and the wounded, 
effectively hiding the deaths. Mack shows how vilification of enemies makes it 
possible to think of them as sub-human or non-human, and so not subject to the usual 
moral considerations.
75
 Sub-humans do not have human sensitivities, and harsh 
treatment is then justified as the only language they understand. 
The Situationist emphasis 
 
By shifting the emphasis away from innate tendencies, personality traits or 
psychopathological risk factors, the situationist view of violence can help explain how 
it is that normal people can become violent perpetrators. According to this view, some 
of the factors that facilitate violence include: 
• Frustration in achieving social goals 
• Presenting an acceptable justification (e.g. removal of evil) 
• Providing official sanction to behave sadistically 
• Being anonymous in that nobody can trace the action back to the individual 
perpetrator 
• Increasing the level of aggression in gradual steps 
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• Removal of responsibility - others are held responsible, if at all.76 
 
Within the situationist perspective, the main driver of the violence is the social 
dynamics of the environment in which people find themselves. Milgram showed that 
an environment that demands obedience, and a type of emotional attachment to 
authority, allows people to behave destructively and violently towards others. 
Similarly, Zimbardo’s experiment showed the destructive effect of a setting where 
individuals are depersonalised and one group is given power over another. This has 
clear implications for how group animosity can become violent, especially when 
Bandura’s tricks that dissipate moral inhibitions come into play.  
 
The situationist view helps in understanding how ordinary people become 
perpetrators. Most of the analysis has been about how the use of authority can 
promote sadistic or vicious behaviour, and how inhibitions can be bypassed. One of 
the important aspects of the situationist view is that it is possible to measure the 
external world and so devise experiments that can test the effectiveness of situational 
factors in promoting aggression. Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments are prime 
examples. Also, in the next chapter I discuss the work of Nisbett and Cohen where 
provocative behaviour (bumping and shoving) was correlated with expressions of 
anger. While it is not possible on ethical grounds to create further social experiments 
that more precisely define the environmental factors that increase the likelihood of a 
violent response to humiliation, it may be possible to analyse such episodes 
historically, as I have done with my analysis of the situation in  Gaza (see Chapter 4). 
 
Milgram, Zimbardo and Bandura base their experiments on individuals or small 
groups. But as their emphasis is on the situation rather than the personality of the 
perpetrators, it is comparatively easy to believe in the effectiveness of scaling up such 
a toxic environment for mass aggression and violence. It is important to be mindful, 
however, that with both Milgram and Zimbardo, not all the participants resorted to 
sadistic behaviour. While the situation undoubtedly played a significant role, there 
still remained, at least for some participants, a reluctance to go down the aggressive 
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route. If we could get a better analysis of the motivations and psychological factors 
that affect the behaviour of such individuals then we could better understand the 
combinations of situation and disposition that lead to violence.  
 
Nevertheless, the situationist perspective reminds us that social conditions can have a 
strong effect on how people react, and that extreme conditions can produce extreme 
responses from an otherwise peaceful population. 
 
The psychosocial perspective on group violence 
 
The dispositional view concentrates on the internal state of mind, and while providing 
insights into the need for self-respect and the power of shame to affect behaviour, it 
has little to say about the conditions under which the behaviour of a group is likely to 
become violent. On the other hand, while the situationist view helps predict when 
violence may occur, it tells us little about the emotional reactions to events. Neither 
alone, therefore, can give us a basis for a theory of emotion-based collective violence, 
as this requires both a description of the social situation, and an explanation of how an 
emotional reaction to these conditions would lead to violence. A theory of humiliation 
needs both a situational and dispositional analysis. 
 
I now present three theories of collective violence that combine the dispositional and 
the situational. 
Unacknowledged shame 
 
Sociologist Thomas Scheff builds on his experience of family systems
77
 and the 
theories of Helen Block Lewis
78
 to present a case for shame and pride as being the 
master emotions. He regards shame as primary for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
shame is automatically expressed when trespassing moral conventions, and is thus an 
important component in an individual’s social conscience. Secondly, he believes that 
the shame and embarrassment signals in human interaction are used to indicate the 
                                                
77
 Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge : Emotions, Nationalism and War (Lincoln, NE: Authors Guild 
BackInPrint.com, 2000). 
78
 Helen Block Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York,: International Universities Press, 
1971). 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 1 
33 of 118 
state of the social bond. Individuals display embarrassment signals to indicate if they 
are feeling too close or engulfed, or too invisible or isolated. In this way, sensitivity to 
shame signals can indicate our humanity. Thirdly, and this is critical to his thesis, 
shame or humiliation that is unacknowledged can be masked by anger or even blind 
rage. This can lead to a shame-rage spiral, where the individual is ashamed at being 
angry at a trivial incident (seemingly trivial because the shame is unacknowledged), 
and then becomes angry about being ashamed. In extreme situations this cycle leads 
to violence and even murder.
79
  
 
Scheff’s analysis appears to work well within family systems as a description of 
communication breakdown and marital violence. It also suggests techniques for repair 
of the marital bond. The concept of unacknowledged shame or humiliation driving an 
individual to anger and rage is an important addition to the literature of violence. 
However, it is unclear how the personal psychology of unacknowledged shame could 
be applied to the collective. His claim that this theory of alienated and dysfunctional 
relationships can be extended to the family of nations seems strained. Much of his 
analysis of the World Wars is concerned with emotional reactions to personal 
interactions between world leaders, which, while instructive, remains only a small 
part of the forces at work in international relations. Unfortunately Scheff apparently 
has not applied these ideas of unacknowledged shame to intrastate group conflict, 
where, I would argue, humiliation and shame can play a significant role.  
 
Petersen’s emotion based theory of ethnic conflict 
 
Roger Petersen is unusual as a political scientist in that he presents an emotion-based 
approach to ethnic conflict.
80
 He applies it to Eastern Europe, where there has been 
collapse of empire, multiple occupation by brutal regimes and a somewhat arbitrary 
drawing of state boundaries. His theory is based on the structure of the ethnic status 
hierarchy when central controls are weak. 
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Petersen regards emotions as enhancing the readiness to address concerns. Each 
emotion focuses on and emphasises an urgency to address a particular concern, often 
blocking out all other distractions. In particular, he considers fear as addressing 
security concerns, hatred in acting on historical grievances and resentment as 
addressing status discrepancies. Rage, however, is by comparison to the other 
emotions, non-instrumental. It can distort reality and lead to counterproductive 
actions, such as searching for scapegoats. 
 
Petersen sums up his theory as a set of predictions about which groups are targeted 
when institutional constraints on violence are removed.
81
 An ethnic group concerned 
for its safety and security is driven by fear and therefore targets the group that it 
regards as the biggest threat. Similarly, a group driven by hatred attacks the group that 
has been frequently attacked in the past with similar justification. When the status 
hierarchy of ethnic groups has been rearranged, such as a change of language policy 
or a rearrangement of the ethnic composition of the political elite, then resentment 
will drive a group to target that group as far up the hierarchy that can be brought down 
through violence. Naturally, these are not mutually exclusive conditions. A group can 
be feared, resented and hated. But if the status of the target group is lower than the 
instigating group, then resentment is not indicated. When a group is driven by rage, 
emotion precedes and clouds cognition and belief formation leading to a distorted 
view of reality. The urge to commit violence overrides other concerns, leading to an 
incoherent selection of the target group. Rage can be brought about by an 
accumulation of unresolved frustrations and resentments, possibly inflicted by 
multiple sources. This echoes the Frustration-Aggression theory discussed earlier. 
 
Petersen also hypothesises about the intensity of violence.
82
 Abrupt status reversals 
are most likely to yield intense resentment and intense violence. Slow changes of 
group status, say through modernisation, yield a less intense hostility that may be 
resolved through peaceful means. 
 
Petersen tests his theory against the many and varied ethnic conflicts in Eastern 
Europe, specifically the Baltic States and the regions of Yugoslavia. He covers the fall 
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of the Ottoman empire, the Russian and German occupations and withdrawals, and 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, during which there were many times when institutional 
control disintegrated, leading to opportunities for ethnic violence. The result of his 
analysis showed that resentment was the main driver of violence, rather than ancient 
hatreds (what he calls the journalistic view) or security fears (the political science 
view). Much of the violence he examined was the result of status reversals within 
society, with the usurped group becoming resentful of their new masters, and using 
violence against the newly raised group to restore the ‘natural order’. 
 
Petersen’s theory of ethnic violence sheds some light on timing, target selection, and 
on the intensity of group violence, and deserves more recognition in the conflict 
studies literature. It is one of the few theories that differentiates between resentment 
and rage. His consideration of resentment as an emotional driver for violence fits well 
within this thesis, as extreme status discrepancy is often associated with humiliation. 
Volkan’s chosen trauma83 
 
Volkan’s chosen trauma theory is a psychoanalytic view of how groups deal with 
major incidents that threaten their existence or identity. His theories are examined in 
some detail in Chapter 2, and so here I present them in summary form. Volkan builds 
on object relations theory as originally espoused by Melanie Klein
84
, and expanded by 
Heinz Kohut
85
, to explain how the process of developing a well-integrated personality 
can go awry. In order to integrate both the nurturing aspects of a carer with occasional 
denial behaviour, the child has to recognise that others, and themselves, have both 
good and bad aspects of personality. In most children this uniting of opposing images 
of self and others is mostly complete by the age of three. Those for whom this 
integration was unsuccessful, see the world in absolute terms of black and white, good 
and evil. For most individuals there are still some unintegrated elements, and Volkan 
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believes that by attaching these good or bad aspects to external objects or individuals, 
the self can maintain its sense of integrated equilibrium. Ethnic symbols, such as flags 
and food, or familiar landmarks can represent safety and comfort, and bolster a sense 
of well-being. Bad aspects, such as laziness, being unclean, or being deceitful can 
often be best dealt with by externalising them onto other objects, such as animals, or 
even other ethnic groups. 
 
One of the duties of a carer is to offer possible targets for externalising these good and 
bad aspects of character, and thus to help the development of a well-integrated child. 
As carers tend to select culturally ‘suitable targets of externalisation’
86
, these good 
and bad images can become part of the ethnic and cultural identity of the group. This 
theory therefore helps to bridge the gap between individual and group psychology. 
 
Volkan believes that under times of stress, such as when the identity of the group is 
being threatened, the group tends to regress to a more childish set of responses, which 
includes a strengthening of the emotional investment in cultural symbols, and the need 
for a strong authoritarian figure to provide guidance. The externalisation of a culture’s 
bad aspects is manifested as the vilification of the enemy, and allows and justifies its 
destruction. Purity, imperilled by the existence of evil, is protected. 
 
Associated with these cultural symbols can be what Volkan calls a chosen trauma. 
The trauma can be a genocide, forced displacement, or even the passing of a golden 
age of prosperity, benevolence and military prowess. Such trauma has similar 
characteristics to an individual’s grief at a great loss, and is associated with a 
mourning process. In the next chapter I show how humiliation interferes with this 
mourning process. If the traumatic loss is not properly mourned, there develops an 
obsession with the past that prevents the group from moving on, as in the grieving 
process. Revenge for a loss can become all-consuming, and even part of the group’s 
identity down the generations unless the mourning process is allowed to complete. For 
example, in Blood Lines, Volkan describes how the Serb obsession with their defeat 
by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 became conflated with their 
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war against the Bosnian Muslims. Mladic, Karadzic and Milosevic saw themselves as 
bearing the responsibility of restoring Serb pride, lost centuries ago.
87
  
 
Volkan’s social trauma theory, together with its externalisation aspects, provides an 
explanation of violence that is deduced from psychoanalytical concepts, and fits well 
with many types of ethnic and other group violence. The role of the emotions is 
central, and the need to control and eradicate evil, expressed as externalised negative 
aspects of the self, provides clues in understanding what drives mass violence and 
atrocities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have briefly outlined some of the main theories of violence, well aware that 
limitations of space have deprived them of the detailed discussion that most of them 
deserve. This thesis is specifically interested in the role that humiliation plays in 
collective violence, and this critical review has shown that some of the existing 
theoretical frameworks for analysing violence do consider the influence of 
humiliation, or its lesser version of status loss, although often as a secondary effect. It 
is worthy of note that almost all of the theories discussed have emerged from Western 
academia, and none considers the different cultural attitudes towards violence as a 
conflict resolution mechanism where different values are placed on pride and honour. 
This is crucial to an understanding of the felt humiliation and the need for vengeance. 
 
From this review of the literature of violence, I conclude that for humiliation to be a 
driver for collective violence two distinct steps are required. Firstly, a situation must 
exist where a people feel oppressed (loss of control over their destiny) or degraded 
(loss of self–esteem). This could be a historical loss of respect, or oppression by 
another group. Situationist theories such as relative deprivation provide a useful way 
of describing and analysing such social conditions. Secondly, there must be a link 
between a degrading situation and the resulting violence. This involves a psychosocial 
analysis such as provided by Petersen and Volkan. The cultural aspects of this link are 
                                                
87
 See the chapter entitled ‘Ancient Fuel for a Modern Inferno’ in Volkan, Bloodlines : From Ethnic 
Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, 50-80. 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 1 
38 of 118 
discussed in Chapter 3, but first, in Chapter 2, I elaborate on why humiliation is such a 
powerful emotion 
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Chapter 2: The power of humiliation 
 
This chapter develops the core concepts of humiliation based primarily on 
psychoanalytic ideas, but also drawing on social and political psychology. Terms 
such as shame, humiliation and rage are defined. Following this I develop the work 
of Volkan and others to show how individual psychology can aggregate to a group 
emotion. Important concepts of unresolved mourning, chosen trauma, external 
reservoirs of “badness” and demonising the enemy are examined in some detail as 
well as the transmission of group identity across the generations. 
 
The negative self-conscious emotions. 
 
In order to discuss the causes and effects of humiliation, some definitions are 
needed. There is a range of  emotions that correspond to feeling bad about ourselves, 
including shame, embarrassment, humiliation and guilt. In general usage, each of 
these words can have overlapping meanings and are often used to describe similar 
emotions in daily conversation. For a systematic study it is important to define these 
terms with more precision. Each discipline that studies these emotions at the 
personal and group level: psychology, sociology, and the cross-disciplinary field of 
political psychology. use these terms without clearly defining them.
88
 The different 
fields often use similar words to describe different effects. Shame can describe 
personal guilt, or private loss of self-esteem or merely public disapproval. 
Humiliation can be used to describe anything from a national defeat to degrading 
torture to public embarrassment.
89
 Coleman notes that when humiliation has been 
considered in conflict studies, it is often used interchangeably with shame and 
embarrassment.
90
 Sometimes definitional problems arise because of the failure to 
see that the same word is being used to describe quite different concepts with 
overlapping emotional undertones. I adopt a more precise usage of these terms and 
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by doing so hope to tease out the different personal and social processes that lead to 
these negative emotions. 
 
Shame is used both in a private and a social sense and part of the confusion in the 
literature arises from different writers concentrating on ‘shame’ without being clear 
about which of these senses they are referring to. I maintain that private and 
behavioural shame are two substantially different concepts, though like most 
negative emotions, they can be felt at the same time, and can reinforce each other. 
The English language captures the difference with the phrases “being ashamed”, a 
private emotion; and “being shamed”, a public event instigated by others. 
 
Private shame is the emotion associated with the unwanted discovery that there is 
something wrong with our very self. This could include revelations of weakness, 
helplessness, stupidity, being sexually defective, unlovable, ugly or just being 
unacceptable in some way to one’s peers. This loss of self-esteem can be devastating 
to the individual, as there is no clear way to remedy the situation. The problem is not 
an action that can be repaired or forgiven; the individual perceives himself or herself 
as being defective. The shame is deserved, because that is how individuals see 
themselves. As Lewis explains, the underlying threat implied by shame is 
abandonment by others, becoming a social pariah.
91
 Of crucial importance to the 
intensity of shame is the question: who observes the defect? The individual will be 
on the alert, always anxious that others are secretly aware of what is wrong with 
them, always looking for signs of recognition. The strength of the emotion of shame 
is magnified if they believe that others can see the inherent flaw. Once an individual 
believes that their defect is visible to others, then whether or not this is true, their 
shame intensifies. It is what others think that is important here. The public aspect of 
the private shame can become unbearable, so strategies are developed to hide or 
deflect attention from the defective self. These strategies are discussed later in the 
chapter. 
 
As self-esteem is to a large extent dependent on the respect of others, the sense of 
being defective can flow from the social sphere to the private. If an someone’s peers 
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behave as if that individual is in some way unacceptable to them, only the very 
thick-skinned or highly self-assured could avoid believing that they are in fact 
defective. This type of social pressure can induce private shame, especially in those 
people who do not already have a strong sense of self-worth. 
 
This definition of shame is consistent with psychologists’ use of the concept and in 
extreme forms represents a psychopathology. However, the social inhibitor that the 
expression “you ought be ashamed of yourself” represents is what I call behavioural 
shame. This is a much milder emotion associated with public disapproval for acting 
inappropriately for our social status. Such shame is socially useful in inhibiting anti-
social behaviour, or behaviour that contradicts social norms. Embarrassment is the 
mild form. To quote Barbalet “embarrassment is the emotion associated with a 
violation of convention, or a breach of manners”.
92
 This type of shame relies 
primarily on the judgement of others, and is how pressure to conform to social 
norms is often expressed. This form of shame is often regarded as a positive 
socialising force, as its opposite “shameless” implies. 
 
Behavioural shame arises from public disapproval of our actions; for example, 
queue-jumping, or public disgust at amassing wealth through cheating others. 
However to be shunned for being ugly, or mocked for sexual failure: this is the 
public disapproval of what a person is, not what they do. This type of public shame 
is almost intolerable for the individual and has a much more powerful effect than 
behavioural shame, which is primarily concerned with maintenance of social norms. 
 
Guilt is the emotion associated with remorse for doing wrong. Guilt can be 
addressed. Reparations can be made, punishments received, the act can be forgiven. 
Guilt can be resolved and dealt with, unlike private shame. As feelings of guilt come 
from within, we can feel guilt even if we are not found guilty in a court of law. This 
remorse acts as a social brake on antisocial behaviour and represents a force for 
conformity that is separate from the likelihood of punishment. As Lewis states, the 
difference between shame and guilt is that while shame is the devaluation of the 
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person, guilt concentrates instead on behaviour.
93
 However, guilt and shame have 
close links, especially where moral transgression is concerned – “what have I done – 
and how could I have done it?”. The failure to live up to moral codes can lead to a 
complex pathology involving guilt, private shame, and if being judged by others, 
behavioural shame as well. 
 
Humiliation also has varying connotations with different usage. Within everyday 
speech it is often used to denote the feeling associated with exposure of inadequacy. 
However, for the purposes of examining collective violence, I restrict its usage to a 
more specific socio-political definition that Coleman derived after reviewing the 
conflict literature: an emotion, triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of 
inferiority resulting from the realization that one is being, or has been, treated in a 
way that departs from the normal expectations for fair and equal human treatment.
94
  
Note that this definition involves public events of which all can be aware, and that 
the normal expectations are of those affected, not those doing the humiliating, and 
so does not rely on the intention of the other party. For example, colonial 
paternalism may be well-meaning, but be perceived as humiliation. Humiliation 
denotes the emotion associated with being treated disrespectfully and undeservedly 
by others. “How dare they treat me like that”. Humiliation occurs when others treat 
an individual or group as if they  perceive their worth or status to be lower than the 
individual or group perceives it to be. Unlike shame, humiliation in this usage, is 
never deserved. Like private shame, it is what the individual believes others think 
about them that intensifies the emotion.  
 
At a large-group level, humiliation can be the result of ethnic discrimination, a 
national defeat in war, the trauma of a genocide or ethnic cleansing, or mistreatment 
by an occupying force. When an individual identifies strongly with an ethnic group 
that suffers unjustified discrimination, then all negative social experiences tend to be 
viewed through the filter of that discrimination. In turn this can be used to justify 
and strengthen the sense of resentment and humiliation, and the sense of group 
identity. “I didn’t get the job because I’m not one of them”.  
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Like guilt, humiliation can be overcome. The portrayal of the underdog overcoming 
great difficulties to become accepted as being worthy is a familiar and common 
theme in popular culture. The little guy who gets his revenge on the bully. “Turning 
the tables” on the oppressor is satisfying in that it appeals to a raw eye-for-an-eye 
sense of justice, and revalidates hapless victims as being worthy in their own 
estimation.  
 
Private shame, however, can arise from the more extreme forms of humiliation, as 
humiliation often involves being helplessly under the control of others. Steinberg 
quotes Gershen Kaufman “There is no more humiliating experience than to have 
one’s relative lack of power, in relation to another, continually rubbed in one’s 
face”.
95
 Being the victim of maltreatment and not being able to control the situation 
intensifies the private shame of helplessness.  
 
The private shame of helplessness that accompanies overpowering degrading 
treatment is very difficult to confront. Fantasies of violent revenge can be mixed in 
with fears of reprisals, and frustration builds. Frustration can lead down many 
avenues. Despair and hopelessness can lead to a submissive, downtrodden compliant 
population. Revenge can lead to calculated plans of targeted attacks to bring down 
the oppressor. But there can also be a lashing out, a humiliated fury, a rage that 
consumes. I argue that this rage phenomenon as a reaction to humiliation contributes 
significantly to group violence and deserves further analysis. 
 
Rage is hot, revenge is cold. Revenge seeks to redress a wrong through calculated 
and usually violent action against a chosen target. However, rage knows no 
calculation. To quote Petersen “Rage often produces cognitive distortions that lead 
to irrelevant or counterproductive actions (such as searching for scapegoats).”
96
 For 
rage, the violence itself is more important than the target. The explosive nature of a 
fit of rage, along with the complete disregard for personal safety makes an enraged 
person fearless and formidable, reassuring them that they are no longer helpless in 
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the hands of their enemies. Rage primarily deals with the private shame aspect of 
humiliation, not the affront itself, as it is the overcoming of helplessness that is the 
driving force, not the righting of wrongs. The target of the violence need not be 
directly related to the humiliation, as the vengeance aspect is secondary to relieving 
the build up of frustrations. To quote Petersen again “an individual in the grasp of 
Rage is seeking an outlet for his or her frustration and is looking to take it out on 
someone, or perhaps even anyone”.
97
 When individuals become enraged, it is often 
difficult for them to offer justifications for their violence, partly because they may 
be responding to the latest minor incident, whereas the fury is the result of a slow 
build up of frustrations.
98
 In  practice it can be difficult to disentangle the rage and 
the vengeance elements of violence generated by humiliation, but knowledge of the 
two forces at work may help to explain why sometimes the justifications and targets 
of violence may seem bizarre to outside observers. 
 
In some societies in Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia, there was a tradition of an 
insulted or humiliated male wreaking terrible revenge in a fit of extreme rage. In 
cases where insults and humiliation have built up over time and are unresolved, the 
insulted male (it is only a male phenomenon) will go into a period of anxious 
brooding or depression. He then emerges in a fit of manic frenzy and starts killing 
everything and anyone in his path until he is stopped or killed. He is known as a 
pengamok, and is often described in terms of a hero battling impossible odds. This is 
the derivation of the English expression “running amok”.
99
 
 
Gilligan has studied extreme violent behaviour in American society, and his work 
yields insights into the underlying forces at work in normal behaviour.
100
 Gilligan 
has interviewed literally thousands of violent criminals over many years in the US 
and believes that for many the shame and humiliation of disrespect is a major 
influence on their behaviour. “I never got so much respect before in my life as I did 
when I pointed a gun at some dude’s face”. When asked why they assaulted or 
killed, a typical response was “He dis’ed [disrespected] me”.
101
 Gilligan describes 
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cases where violent prisoners would prefer to die than be humbled by prison 
officers. Several hundred violent criminals in the United States each year commit 
“suicide by cop”, where they go to their deaths in a hail of gunfire, killing as many 
as possible. According to Gilligan, this is a common fantasy of violent prison 
inmates. For some, being disrespected by their enemies is such torment that they are 
willing to die in a blaze of glory for pride and self-respect and to be honoured by 
their peers. They run amok. 
 
Gilligan believes that the fear that criminals provoke in their victims is a type of 
ersatz form of respect.
102
 However, violence, or its credible threat, is a way of taking 
charge, so the respect is not fake, but real. The perpetrator of violence is in control 
of the situation, all attention revolves around him or her, and the enhanced status 
gained by his or her actions is the closest many criminals get to self-esteem. 
According to Gilligan, self-esteem is often lacking in the psyche of violent 
criminals. I argue later that the need to take control is often the reaction to 
humiliation. Gilligan reports that many of the most violent inmates were humiliated, 
abused and neglected during their childhood, severely undermining any sense of 
self-worth at an early and formative stage. He believes this leads to a lack of 
empathy with their victims, and little or no sense of remorse or guilt, almost as if 
what little love they possessed they needed for themselves. 
 
Gilligan’s in-depth interviews with violent prisoners convinced him 
 
that the basic psychological motive, or cause, of violent behaviour is the wish 
to ward off or eliminate the feeling of shame and humiliation – a feeling that is 
painful and can even be intolerable and overwhelming – and replace it with its 
opposite, the feeling of pride.103 
 
Using these more precise definitions of shame, guilt and humiliation it becomes 
easier to clarify the separate aspects of these negative emotions. Guilt is the private 
emotion of remorse associated with morality and disobeying social norms. Private 
shame is associated with revelations about ourselves that we prefer hidden from 
view. Behavioural shame is concerned with peer disapproval of our actions. 
                                                
102
 Ibid.: 1151. 
103 Ibid.: 1154. 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 2 
46 of 118 
Humiliation is the result of treatment perceived as degrading. Expressed in this way, 
it is easy to see how guilt, private shame, behavioural shame and humiliation can 
provide a psychologically toxic mix in malfunctioning families or societies. 
 
Within different cultures the extent of the negative consequences may differ for each 
of these emotions. In Chapter 3, I discuss how in cultures with a strong emphasis on 
honour, self-esteem is almost completely defined by social approval. In such 
societies, behaving honourably and the fear of behavioural shame are prime, as 
opposed to those where honour is more often seen as secondary to personal gain or 
political interests. 
 
Strategies for dealing with shame and humiliation 
 
Prolonged periods of intense shame or humiliation can severely damage self-esteem. 
I maintain that the need for self-esteem and respect is a deep instinctual need. 
Maslow, for example, places this after the need for belonging and love in his 
hierarchy of human needs.
104
 The ego, in its drive to maintain self-esteem uses many 
strategies to avoid the damage of shame and humiliation. Nathanson, through 
observation and his clinical work, has developed his “compass of shame” to classify 
these various strategies.
105
 The four points of this shame compass are: withdrawal, 
attack-self, avoidance or disavowal, and attack-other. Nathanson’s compass is a way 
of classifying the strategies of repairing or avoiding psychological damage 
associated with the public observation of private shame, humiliation and to a lesser 
extent, behavioural shame and guilt, as I have defined them earlier in the chapter. 
 
Withdrawal is a strategy for both repairing and avoiding the shame effect. After a 
shaming event, individuals withdraw from the glare of the public eye to give 
themselves time and space to lick their psychological wounds and rebuild their self-
esteem. Privacy allows the individual to minimise the public aspects of private 
shame. This need to escape explains why public punishment can be so painful. 
Being put in the public stocks for ridicule removes the opportunity to rebuild 
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psychologically and exacerbates the punishment, as the victim’s sense of shame is 
reinforced rather than being allowed to recover. 
 
When the private shame is based on a social defect (dysfunctional sexuality or belief 
that one is unlovable or otherwise unacceptable) then withdrawing from close 
human contact is a way of avoiding the associated pain. Shyness can be a mild form 
of this withdrawal.  
 
The attack-self strategy involves controlling and defusing public disapproval. 
Making small self-deprecating jokes is the most healthy version of this strategy, 
where the individual makes his or her deficiencies acceptable through fun and 
laughter, defusing public shame. Another technique under this heading is to admit to 
some social embarrassment. Once we accept mild social shame, we put ourselves at 
the mercy of others, but in most social circles this produces positive results, as most 
people are willing to accept and forgive the social mistakes of others when they 
admit them. Although shyness is essentially a means of social withdrawal, there may 
be an element of attack-self defence strategy. “Don’t attack me, as I am socially 
insignificant anyway”. Masochistic behaviour may also have an element of this 
attack-self strategy as a way of controlling degradation, hence making it less 
psychologically damaging.
106
 
 
Avoidance, or disavowal, relates to a set of strategies designed to combat the public 
shame associated with a real or imagined physical defect or inability to be loved or 
accepted. A child living in an abusive family or even one unable to show love 
chooses the safest option. Rather than accept the situation that their parents are 
incapable of love and protection, children believe that their parents behave in an 
unloving way because they have a bad or defective child. The child accepts shame 
rather than terror.
107
 As adults, such people will have either accepted and 
internalised their shame, or be determined to overcome their (possibly imaginary) 
defects. Those who have internalised their shame want to distract the public gaze 
(and if possible their own internal gaze) away from the danger areas, and display 
their strength, wealth, beauty, intelligence, or sexual prowess as alternative aspects 
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of themselves. Those determined to overcome their defects become obsessed with 
self-improvement, not as a way of reaching their true potential, but as a shame 
avoidance strategy.  
 
When an individual’s sense of size, strength or ability is being undermined or 
devalued in some way, then Nathanson argues that the attack-other mode becomes 
the most likely form of defence, especially when societal or family norms sanction 
such behaviour.
108
 There are two intermingled modes of behaviour being described 
here. A private sense of inferiority can be publicly masked by put-downs, sarcasm, 
and confrontational behaviour to persuade the world (including the self) that there is 
nothing weak or defective here. Similar behaviour, though often more explosive, is 
associated with being humiliated, the active devaluing by others. The attack-other 
response in this case is designed to right a wrong, and re-establish the proper status 
hierarchy. As explained earlier, humiliation and private shame are closely related, 
and the combined effects are more likely to lead to aggression than either alone. The 
range of the attack-other reaction can vary from social snub all the way to furious 
physical attack. It can be expressed as a sudden explosive rage, or a cold calculating 
put-down. An attack-other incident provoked by humiliation has the primary 
psychological purpose of reducing the status of the other, rather than to gain power 
for other purposes
109
, so we should not be too keen to look for ‘rational’ motives in 
violent reaction to oppression (though neither should we use such thinking to ignore 
real grievances).  
 
However, if the attack is driven by private shame it switches the attention away from 
the self, as it is designed to hide a sense of inadequacy. This has the important 
consequence that in deflecting attention from our own inadequacy we now have to 
have a target for our aggression, the enemy. Later I show how Volkan and Mack use 
this concept to explain how and why we demonise others. For now we can say that 
by attacking others we have externalised our problems and given them a physical 
embodiment that we can rail against. “It’s all their fault, and once we have got rid of 
them, everything will be fine”. We have created an enemy for our own purposes. 
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Where does “the enemy” come from? 
 
Sometimes we find people or ethnic groups to hate or be worthy of our contempt. 
They are unclean, untrustworthy, cowards, and work to undermine us often in secret 
ways. How does it happen that sometimes we need to create a collective malevolent 
“other”? The answer, I believe, is not only one of political opportunism by those 
wishing to distract us from other problems or gain popularity by defending core 
values, though this obviously plays a part. There is also the underlying psychosocial 
need that leaders can either use to their advantage, or recognising the dangers, move 
to mitigate. 
 
To understand this process it is necessary to consider the psychoanalytic object 
relations theories of Klein
110
, Kohut
111
, Kernberg
112
, Volkan
113
 and others regarding 
how we develop and cope with flaws in our character. Freudian psychoanalysis 
concentrates on the structure of the id, ego and superego, and the structural conflicts 
that arise within the psyche.
114
 Object relations theory takes this idea further by 
adding other concepts that add to our understanding of psychic processes. Object 
relations theory describes how an infant develops a sense of self through 
relationships with objects and other people. These relationships help to shape the 
structure of the id, ego and superego, and how they interact. As an infant starts to 
see himself or herself as separate from those around him, he or she at first sees the 
caretaker (usually the mother) as two different ‘others’ – the one that gratifies his or 
her needs, and the one that thwarts and frustrates him or her. Similarly the child 
cannot realise that he or she is one person and capable of being both contented and 
miserable. The child has to develop his or her concept of identity to integrate these 
opposing images. According to Volkan, this integration of good and bad aspects of 
our self and of others is largely complete after 36 months, when the child integrates 
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opposing images of self and other.
115
 At this stage of development the child 
understands that various, even opposing, emotions and self-images can be merged 
into a single identity.  
 
Volkan believes that for most of us this melding of opposites is never quite 
completed, and so we must somehow deal with the tensions of opposing self-
images.
116
 One coping technique is to cast out these good and bad opposing images 
onto external objects. Kohut describes a similar concept of “splitting” where 
individuals with a damaged sense of self split off their bad traits and devalued 
weaknesses and project them onto others.
117
 Staub believes harsh treatment during a 
child’s development leads to difficulties in liking and accepting oneself. Rather than 
seeing, examining and accepting conflicting and problematic aspects within oneself, 
one projects them onto other people, thus creating a hated other.
118
 These theories 
maintain that this externalisation helps to resolve internal tensions, and allows us to 
maintain an integrated sense of self. These targets of externalisation (or reservoirs, 
as Volkan calls them) provide a sense of identity comfort.
119
 Good self-images are 
cast onto external objects as a form of safekeeping for later retrieval. For example, 
borscht (a beetroot and potato soup) beloved by Russians and Eastern Europeans is 
often a comfort when under stress, or a “nice cup of tea” for the English. Bad self-
images of untrustworthiness, criminal tendencies or secrecy are transferred onto 
other groups or objects. For example, parents let their children know who their 
appropriate friends should be. Other religions’ places of worship are where secret 
evil plans are hatched under the guise of piety. Dogs and pigs in some cultures 
represent uncleanliness and disgust. These good and bad “containers” tend to be 
culturally defined, and are adopted almost instinctively from the parents by children 
as they learn what is good and what is “other” or hateful. As these children mix with 
other children who share the same “containers”, so a sense of group cohesion 
develops that in later years becomes the basis of cultural identity. As the child 
becomes an adolescent and starts to look beyond the family for a sense of identity, 
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the differences of language, skin colour and religion can become the basis for more 
abstract concepts of race and culture, and the bad reservoirs become more defined in 
terms of cultural or ethnic identity.
120
 The good and bad aspects of the group identity 
and culture can be to some extent recognised and integrated into the personality of 
the individual, but there will still be the external “containers” that can be called upon 
when under stress. For example, when in a foreign land, hearing one’s own language 
spoken can be comforting, as is eating food from home. Bad “containers” can be 
used to shift responsibility away from dealing with a group’s problems. For example 
“they” are stealing our jobs, raping our women, stirring up trouble. 
 
Demonising the enemy 
 
Having an enemy can therefore be psychologically beneficial. It provides a place to 
“hold” flawed aspects of our character so we can externalise and confront them, and 
thus it also purifies us – they are evil, treacherous and violent, we are trusting and 
peace loving. Once an evil enemy has been established, the allocation of “good” and 
“bad” becomes automatic. To quote Moses, “The more the enemy is the demon, the 
more pure we become ourselves – and, of course, the more difficult it is for 
ourselves to be self-critical”.
121
 Waller’s analysis of social categorisation states that 
in-group assumed similarity (all of us are like me) and out-group homogeneity (all 
of them are similar) leads to easy stereotyping, and exaggerates the differences 
between us and them.
122
 This also results in a bias towards information that stresses 
differences rather than similarities between groups. Similarly, Shaw points out that 
there is a basic human tendency to attribute negative personality attributes to people 
whom we dislike and who do things of which we disapprove, whereas if those same 
things are done by people we like, we rationalise this as being primarily the result of  
environmental circumstances.
123
 So behaviour described as unfortunate but 
necessary if performed by our brave men in difficult circumstances is labelled 
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treacherous and vile when the enemy does it. When we call a ceasefire, it shows we 
want to give peace a chance, but when they call a ceasefire, it is so that they can 
have time to regroup and rearm.  
 
Strong adherents of one side of the conflict tend not to see atrocities committed by 
their own side. When such matters are mentioned, they refuse to focus on the issue, 
and divert attention immediately to the atrocities committed by the other. The 
rhetoric of the Irish troubles and the sectarian violence in Iraq show such selective 
blindness. In extremis, this can lead to the idea that the enemy is so devious that it 
commits atrocities against itself just to blame their enemy, as that is the only 
psychological way to square the undeniable fact of the event with an idealised self-
view.
124
 Each side has selective recall of events, so that only those aspects of history 
that conform with its self-image are given any importance. Each claims history is on 
its side. In short, the entire world view is manipulated and mythologised both 
unconsciously and intentionally to reflect our goodness and their badness. 
 
If “they” are nasty, evil and treacherous, then the rules of normal moral conduct do 
not apply. As somehow a lower form of humanity, they are not subject to natural 
human sensitivities, so they will only respond to harsh treatment. Demonising the 
enemy gives permission for and even justifies and entitles their destruction.
125
 
Where people would normally feel guilty about harming others, the demonising 
removes that guilt. There is an obvious danger here, however. By devaluing others 
we are denying them their humanity and blocking out any sympathy for or empathy 
with their situation – in fact we have shown ourselves to be lacking in humanity. 
 
All of the above does not deny the existence of real threats from others who want to 
conquer, kill and steal, but I hope helps explain some of the ferocity felt towards the 
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enemy, and the difficulties in resolving such conflicts rationally. Each side often has 
its own set of often mutually exclusive “facts” to justify its hostility and violence. 
 
The need to humiliate. 
 
If a group poses a real security threat to another, then there are a number of ways to 
remove that threat. For example, politically you can convince the group that the 
gains from carrying out the threat would not be worth the effort, losses and pain 
required to carry it out. Militarily, you can remove their ability to carry out the threat 
by disabling their means of aggression – destroying their army or weapons. Within 
such a calculus there is no mutilation, rape, slaughter of civilians, torture, or ethnic 
cleansing which is so often a part of conflict. So why do such horrific acts get 
played out in the name of “defending ourselves”? I argue that this type of behaviour 
can be partly understood as an attempt to control the demons that the enemy 
represents. In order to make ourselves pure we have to conquer evil, and this means 
eradicating those reservoirs, those containers, that hold the bad images of ourselves. 
All things lazy, treacherous, dirty, cheating, scheming, underhand, and, ironically 
enough, violent and aggressive must be completely overcome, violently if necessary. 
 
There are two ways to overcome a psychological threat – either banish it or 
completely control it so it is no longer a threat. At a raw visceral level, atrocities 
against civilians are proof of power and control. The instigators of an atrocity 
against another person is proving both to themselves and the other that they have 
complete and utter control over the other, thereby humiliating him/her.
126
 When a 
single movement can bring terror or hope, torturers know they have complete 
control over the innermost thoughts and feelings of the victim. This may explain 
why sometimes people are tortured before being killed. The bad reservoir, or person, 
is completely controlled and then removed. The victims have been subjected to 
atrocities, treated as if they are less than human, completely humiliated and suffered 
terrible degradation so that the aggressors can battle their demons.  
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Humiliation is also used as a weapon of war to demoralise the enemy and make 
them less eager to fight. Raping women humiliates the men who are unable to 
defend them. Displaying tortured bodies of murdered compatriots can be a military 
strategy to discourage further resistance. The main thread of my argument in this 
thesis is that a humiliated people will sooner or later take revenge, so such tactics 
have at best a short-term benefit. A military strategy of humiliation through 
degradation does not, however, explain how torture and atrocities can be carried out 
in cold blood, or even with some enthusiasm, unless there are others factors at work. 
For some, the “demons” that the enemy represents make it possible for them to carry 
out such horrors: demonising the enemy makes it practicable to use atrocity as a 
weapon. 
 
The urge to humiliate can be passed through to the victims by example. For instance, 
a colonial power can express its power by suppressing its citizens. The oppressed, 
although hating the oppressor, can also respect the power implied in the casual day 
to day humiliations that a coloniser inflicts on its victims. When the colonial power 
leaves, the new power elite may wish to establish its credentials as a powerful force, 
and may well copy the colonialist style of governing to prove that they are indeed 
the new masters. Franz Fanon found that colonised peoples, once freed, often 
imitated the violence of their oppressors, as they admire the power and control that 
oppressors possessed, while hating them for it.
127
 
 
There is also another force at work. A humiliated people can have a sense of 
retributive justice which demands a type of “equality of suffering”.
128
 Only when an 
oppressor has experienced the same type of hardships do the victims feel that the 
situation has been resolved, that balance has been restored and justice done. “Only 
when you are attacked at random, only when your daily life is wrecked by violence, 
only then will you realise what you have done to us. Now you know how it feels.” 
Then humiliation begets humiliation, which not only balances the scales, but also 
refutes the original humiliation, as the ability to respond displays in itself the 
overcoming of a demeaning powerlessness. 
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The role of historical trauma 
 
According to Volkan, some ethnic groups have a major traumatic experience that 
has become part of their cultural identity.
129
 This experience may have been a defeat 
in battle, or a genocide, or a major loss of prestige or status. The humiliation of this 
event lives on in the collective memory, and it becomes the job of the next 
generation to either resolve the loss or reverse the humiliation. No attempt to set the 
record straight will have any effect, as it is not the facts of the event that are 
relevant, but its mythologised nature as handed down the generations. Examples of 
such chosen trauma include: 
• Shi’a – the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala  680 130 
• Serbs – battle of Kosovo 1389 
• Andalus syndrome – Muslim expulsion from Spain 1492 
• Czechs – battle of Bila Hora 1620 131 
• Scots – battle of Culloden 1746 
• Navajo Indians – Long Walk 1864 
• Lakota Indians – battle of Wounded Knee 1890 
• Armenians – Turkish genocide 1915-17 
• Jews – Holocaust WWII 
• Crimean Tartars – deportation 1944 
• Arabs – defeat by Israel 1967 
 
This trauma may lie dormant for a long time, and not be particularly evident in the 
group’s psyche. But when a group is under stress, or needs to reassert its identity it 
can become a strong psychological force, available for a leader to manipulate for 
political ends.
132
  No matter how distant the original trauma, there is a sense of 
immediacy when the fears and anxieties from a new threat conform with those of the 
historical trauma, and the new enemy will be perceived as having the characteristics 
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of the ancient enemy. This new threat then becomes a new opportunity for the 
current generation to regain what was lost, or revenge the past humiliation – to fulfil 
historical destiny. This closeness between the current threat and ancient trauma leads 
to the feeling that the ancient trauma happened just yesterday, as the emotional 
effects become alive in the group psyche. An opportunistic leader can manipulate 
such social forces for nationalistic ends, or to identify himself with a historical 
heroic figure from a more glorious past. Volkan describes in chilling detail how 
Milosevic did exactly this in Serbia during the break-up of Yugoslavia.
133
 
 
The transmission of this trauma is not simply a matter of relating a story of loss to 
the next generation. Through studies of individual cases of trauma, it has been 
observed that the mother’s anxiety, unconscious fantasies, and the perceptions and 
expectations of the external world for her child, can pass through to the child’s 
developing sense of self.
134
 This process enables the trauma to pass through the 
generations. Rita Rogers regards the transmission of historical enmity as a form of 
child abuse which is taken for granted in schools and in the military as a form of 
cultural identity formation.
135
  Children, especially adolescents, are acutely aware of 
their parents’ fallibility. They listen to their rage against the cruel oppressor, and 
they see the shame and humiliation of their inaction – the excuses and 
interpretations that display their sense of failure and loss of self-esteem. Youth not 
only wants to prove itself stronger than the previous generation, it wants to revenge 
the indignities of the elders. But having seen the failure of the past generation, and 
seeing them as weak, they can no longer trust their parents’ guidance. Peer groups 
and revolutionary leaders are uncontaminated by this past failure, and so can provide 
a path for revenge. This is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4, the Gaza case 
study. 
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On being a victim 
 
Nico Frijda argues that revenge for victims can be very effective in showing that 
they are in control of events, proof that they no longer have to submit to the power 
of others.
136
 The need to restore self-esteem after being subjected to wilfully 
inflicted harm is essential to one’s sense of worth and identity. He believes that a 
strong emotional driver for revenge is one of equalising the suffering, so that the 
oppressor feels the same extent of hurt or pain as the victim. 
 
There is a psychological benefit in a victimised ethnic group keeping its victimhood 
a priority. Mack describes what he calls the “ego of victimization”, the incapacity of 
a traumatised ethnic group to empathise with the suffering of another group.
137
 He 
describes it as being the group form of the narcissism or self-centredness of some 
individuals who see themselves as having been so hurt or deprived in the past that 
they can attend only to their own needs, feeling little or no empathy for the hurt they 
inflict on others. Wearing the label of victim can provide a group with an assumed 
entitlement to wreak revenge. Entitlement is the belief that a group can override 
normal moral concerns and can demand special rights and privileges. This belief of 
being an exception can be triggered by the extent of suffering endured. “I may do 
wrong because wrong has been done to me”. It is possible that the urgency and 
righteousness of one’s own claim for retribution can completely override any 
recognition of the injury this causes the enemy. Horowitz, in his study of deadly 
riots, talks of the complete absence of remorse in a post-riot atmosphere. Most 
people find the revenge killings justifiable in terms of “they had it coming”, “taught 
them a lesson”, “deserved it”.
138
 Nadler reports that both Israelis and Palestinians 
became attached to their victim status, as they use it to morally justify their 
aggression towards each other.
139
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 Losing self-esteem and mourning 
 
Mourning has been described as the psychological process through which an 
individual learns to bear a loss through repeated and painful remembering.
140
 
Humiliation involves the loss of self-esteem, and the resolution of that loss is a type 
of mourning. The study of the mourning process may yield insights as to how a 
person, or a people, can deal with humiliation. 
 
The process of mourning that an individual undergoes after a personal loss of a 
loved one has been well studied. It is generally accepted that there are reasonably 
well-defined stages in the mourning process.
141
 The naming and number of these 
stages can differ, but the gist of these various descriptions does not vary widely. I 
describe here the three stages of mourning as presented by Rando. Note that the two 
later stages have considerable overlap.
142
 
 
Avoidance.  
The first reaction is denial. After the initial shock and bewilderment, a type 
of emotional anaesthesia sets in to deny the reality of the event. This allows 
time and emotional space for the mourner to slowly absorb the reality of the 
loss. 
 
Confrontation 
The loss has now to be confronted and dealt with. At first, separation anxiety 
is the prime feature of the grief. Images associated with the loss are recalled 
obsessively. During this confrontation phase there is an excruciating learning 
process, where the mourner has to accept the new reality. Gradually the 
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unconscious desire to deny the loss fades as the harshly learnt new reality 
gets accepted into the daily life of the mourner, and the past no longer 
continually intrudes. In Freudian terms, the ego has succeeded in freeing its 
libido from the lost object. The deceased is no longer idealised, and both 
positive and negative aspects of the relationship are recognised.  
 
As in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) there is a strong need for 
others to acknowledge the suffering and pain to help establish the conditions 
for recovery.
143
 
 
For many, a loss can involve a shake-up of their entire assumptive world. 
Core beliefs about how they interact with the world and who they actually 
are no longer have the same validity. The familiar world can seem strange. 
“How can I be a father without children, or a tribesman without a village?” 
As well as having to deal with the separation grief, they also have to deal 
with the stress of  losing part of their identity. 
 
Accommodation 
Once the reality of the loss has been accepted, this last phase deals with re-
establishing an integrated personality. The loss has to be integrated into the 
psyche in such a way as to not interfere with new plans and projects. The 
memory is not forgotten, but is under the control of the mourner and no 
longer debilitating. It is reactivated and respected during anniversaries or 
other memorial occasions. It has been observed that during this final stage of 
mourning a great energy is released that lifts a burden from the mind, as if a 
psychic drag has been removed.
144
 New projects no longer betray the 
significance of the loss. 
 
There are many ways in which the mourning process can go awry, and the final 
accommodation phase remain incomplete. Most common is chronic mourning, 
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where the acute symptoms of anxiety and agitation persist interminably.
145
 There 
remains a continual obsession with the loss, life gets stuck in a futile attempt to 
reunite with it, and all other priorities become insignificant. There is a sense that the 
loss is very recent, though it may have occurred years previously. 
 
Traumatic loss associated with humiliation differs from other types of trauma in that 
whenever the event is recalled, the humiliation is relived. Coleman, Goldman and 
Kruger present a list of studies that show that pain and fear can be recalled without 
being felt anew – there is the memory of the pain and fear, but not more pain and 
fear itself.
146
  However it has been shown that this is not necessarily so with 
humiliation – the more it is remembered, the more keenly it is felt. This, 
incidentally, directly contradicts catharsis theory (expressing negative emotions 
weakens them). Margalit writes, “[W]e can hardly remember insults without reliving 
them…The wounds of insult and humiliation keep bleeding long after the painful 
physical injuries have crusted over”.
147
 
 
As humiliation does not dissipate on recall, the repetition compulsion remains 
strong, and the mourning cannot be completed. This compulsion to relive the event 
to try to gain some mastery over it is described by Mirscherlich-Nielsen and she 
believes that “the process of mourning frees the individual from a neurotic 
compulsion to repeat the same thing over and over again”.
148
 
 
Extreme humiliation is in itself a traumatic loss. Status, self-esteem and regard are 
all gone; a sense of helplessness, anger and despair haunts the victim. The victim’s 
world is destroyed, and the sense of self severely damaged. The reserves of strength 
required to come to terms with a new reality are badly depleted. Chronic mourning, 
with its interminable anger and despair, is the most likely result. 
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Judith Herman describes the process of mourning traumatic loss for the individual, 
and believes that the mourning process can stagnate or remain unresolved when the 
resistance to mourning takes the form of a magical resolution through revenge,  
forgiveness or compensation. 
 
The revenge fantasy is often a mirror image of the traumatic memory, in 
which the roles of perpetrator and victim are reversed. . . The revenge fantasy 
is one form of the wish for catharsis. The victim imagines that she can get rid 
of the terror, shame and pain of then trauma by retaliating against the 
perpetrator. The desire for revenge also arises out of the experience of 
complete helplessness. In her humiliated fury, the victim imagines that 
revenge is the only way to restore her own sense of power. She also imagines 
that this is the only way to force the perpetrator to acknowledge the harm he 
has done her.
149
 
 
 
She also notes that those who do carry out revenge do not find themselves cured, but 
suffer the most severe emotional disturbance.
150
 
 
While we are mostly familiar with the personal mourning process described above, I 
maintain that there are substantial similarities between personal mourning and the 
processes of a group coping with a trauma associated with loss, such as a mass 
slaughter, forced displacement or a military defeat. The mourning process in both 
cases, goes through similar phases and can encounter similar problems, though 
different aspects can take on a greater priority with group trauma.  
 
The need for acknowledgement and redress often defines the struggle for a group to 
come to terms with a loss. For example, the failure of the Turks to acknowledge the 
1915 Armenian genocide is still an important and unresolved issue in Armenian and 
Turkish relations nearly a century later. 
 
Volkan’s description of an ancient trauma being awakened when a sense of identity 
is under threat has certain parallels with chronic mourning.
151
  There is the need for 
public acknowledgement of the pain and suffering, the obsession with the past that 
overrides all other priorities, the time collapse giving immediacy to an historical 
event and thus adding emotional intensity, and the need to somehow make the 
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trauma explicable often by unrealistically assigning blame. All these effects are 
magnified when humiliation plays a part in the trauma, and makes it more likely that 
chronic mourning results. 
 
Perhaps it is possible to adapt the techniques that are used to help deal with personal 
loss to help groups better cope with a traumatic past. For example, it may be 
possible in some cases for an oppressor to help with the mourning process by 
acknowledging the injury they have inflicted. This revalidates the injured party and 
raises their self-esteem, and could be taken as a signal to complete the mourning 
process and move on.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, group violence and humiliation are closely linked. Not only is it 
likely a humiliated people eventually take revenge, but the violence humiliation 
provokes will have an element of humiliation to equalise the suffering, to balance 
the scales of retributive justice. Demonising the enemy as a means of controlling and 
destroying the hated other can lead directly to acts of humiliation, both as a means of 
control, and a proof of control. In extreme cases, this can lead to genocide, rape, 
torture, population displacements and all the concomitant horrors of group violence. 
 
Those groups who have suffered terrible loss or trauma with a strong element of 
humiliation may not be able to come to terms with that loss, because humiliation 
complicates the mourning process, and can lead to an interminable sense of injustice 
that can last for generations. For a group to move forward and to plan new ways to 
develop can feel like a betrayal of years of emotional investment in the necessity to 
right an ancient wrong. This emotional investment effectively paralyses the 
development of the group. Revenge, or a pining for former glory, becomes part of 
the group’s identity, and this in itself can lead to it inflicting humiliation on others, 
and if retaliation occurs, further humiliation for the group. 
 
In the next chapter I will investigate how social and cultural norms play their part in 
the feeling of humiliation, and how different cultural forces affect the response. 
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Chapter 3: The cultural dimension 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed how humiliation can lead to violence when the need 
for self-esteem demands a response. We are social animals, and what we regard as 
humiliation and what is permissible as a response is largely influenced by social and 
cultural considerations. In this chapter I investigate how individuals in different 
cultures experience loss of status and humiliation, and how they react to it. What a 
Japanese person may find deeply humiliating, an American may not even notice. A 
street gang boss aggressively confronts any insult, whereas an employee in a company 
may remain outwardly calm but silently resentful. In Iraq, a woman directing traffic is 
humiliating to the drivers, but not in London or New York.
152
 
 
The study of emotions across cultures is fraught with difficulties. There are problems 
of translation and the differences of nuance that each culture displays in the use of not 
quite equivalent words. For example, to consider the Japanese word on as translating 
to obligation misses the inherent nuances of love, loyalty and indebtedness. Australian 
aborigines use the word shame in the context of propriety and respect, and it has little 
to do with low self-esteem.
153
  
 
Cultures are not easily encapsulated. With constant interaction between societies, the 
set of shared beliefs, attitudes and behaviours that comprise a culture are continually 
changing as the cultural influences from different parts of the world take root. The 
speed of change also varies within different parts of a society, so culture can vary in 
the way it is both felt and expressed. Traditional village life may differ significantly 
from a more liberal metropolitan lifestyle and beliefs in the same society. However, 
despite this dynamic heterogeneity, there remain core beliefs and values that 
distinguish different cultures, and it is these underlying differences that I wish to 
explore.  
 
                                                
152 Fontan, "Polarization between Occupier and Occupied in  Post-Saddam Iraq: Colonial Humiliation 
and the Formation of Political Violence," 218.  
153
 Jean Harkins, "Linguistic and Cultural Differences in Concepts of Shame," in Shame and the 
Modern Self, ed. D Parker, R Dalziell, and I Wright (Kew, Vic: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1996), 
87.  
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 3 
64 of 118 
In an attempt to cut through these complexities, a small fraternity of social 
psychologists believes that breaking down the emotional response to its various 
components can provide a framework for studying cultural differences in emotions.
154
 
The components include : 
• Appraisal – how the event is judged by the affected person 
• Action tendency – what actions are the result of the appraisal 
• Associated feelings – escape, positive or negative feelings, need to control the 
situation. 
• Social sharing – the need to share feelings with others 
 
Roseman believes that an analysis of appraisal: the ways different people judge 
situations, is the prime indicator of cultural difference. He tested for anger, sadness 
and fear comparing Americans and Indians and showed that once one knows how an 
event is judged, then the action tendency and the associated feelings are more 
predictable across cultures.
155
 For example, the death of a loved one through natural 
causes leads to sadness. However, if the death is caused by another person who could 
have been stopped, the associated emotion would be anger. Fear is the likely response 
when a punishing event is likely and the victim has no power to prevent it. However, 
Mosquera showed that for pride, shame and anger in Spain and the Netherlands, the 
action tendencies were significantly different.
156
 I return to this research later. 
 
According to this appraisal theory, similar events would be judged differently in 
different cultures. In cultures where individuals feel they have little control over 
outcomes, they tend to feel more detached from events so anger would be a less 
common response than in those cultures where any personal misfortune is regarded as 
the work of an enemy, or an adversary’s conspiracy or curse. 
 
In the previous chapter I defined humiliation as occurring when others treat an 
individual or group as if their worth or status is lower than the individual or group 
perceives it to be. Note that neither the intention nor the attitude of the offending party 
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plays a part in the humiliation. The as if is in the mind of the humiliated individual. 
The affected party feels humiliated only if they believe they are being treated 
disrespectfully, so appraisal theory is part of the definition. 
 
Roseman gives us a framework with which to examine humiliation across cultures. 
We can look at what type of events are interpreted as humiliating and how cultural 
considerations affect the resultant action. Also we can assess how the feeling is shared 
socially. 
 
In a similar vein, Coleman contends that there is a set of emotional rules and norms 
that govern the value placed on certain emotions, and how individuals in any given 
culture should respond to them.
157
 These emotional rules are divided into three broad 
categories: 
1. Privileges. These define the emotional circumstances under which behaviour 
that would normally be condemned is allowable. For example, an angry 
outburst by a man grieving the death of his wife. 
2. Restrictions. The limitations on behaviour after or during an emotionally 
intense episode. An example here would be courting shortly after the death of 
a spouse. 
3. Obligations. Behaviour that is socially required after an emotionally intense 
episode, such as wearing black at a funeral. 
These emotional rules are part of the culture, and to a large extent determine the 
nature, extent and intensity of the behavioural response. I refer to these core concepts 
later in this chapter. 
 
In particular, Coleman contends that the extent to which humiliation yields an 
emotional and aggressive response is  related to how social roles and norms restrict 
aggressive reactions. His experiment with 56 English speaking males (with internet 
access), asking them to respond to different scenarios, did indeed confirm this 
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hypothesis.
158
  The implications are clear: a violent reaction to humiliation is largely 
tempered by social expectations and cultural norms. 
 
Cultural tendencies 
 
In this section I show that by placing different cultures along a continuum from 
collective to individualistic, it becomes possible to make some generalisations about 
how people from these cultures perceive and react to humiliation. 
 
Any generalisation or classification of whole societies will obviously be too crude a 
device to predict how particular events unfold at a particular time, or how different 
people within that society act or react. As stated earlier, cultures are neither static nor 
monolithic. Nevertheless, I hope to show that by abstracting some features of how 
people in different societies respond and behave, I can make some generalisations that 
help to understand how humiliation and shame relate to violence. 
 
Shweder presents a useful way to analyse what societies define as ethical or moral 
behaviour.
159
 Although most societies share many values: loyalty, obedience, 
freedom, duty, honesty, courage, equality, choice, liberty. According to Shweder they 
tend to cluster into two types of ethical code. 
 
The morals of the individual comprise a set of values which promote individual 
autonomy. These include liberty, human rights, equality, choice, dignity, curiosity, 
personal rights, rule of law, democratic ideals and freedom of religion. Moral 
authority resides within the individual. Individuals partake in a give and take 
transaction with society. These ideas gained prominence during the Enlightenment, 
along with the advance of science, and the separation of church and state. In such 
societies, self-esteem is based primarily on how one perceives oneself. The northern 
United States is an exemplar of the individualistic society, where freedom, ambition 
and self-interest are highly prized values. 
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The morals of the collective emphasise those values which promote the individual as 
part of a collective endeavour. The individual is defined primarily by his or her role in 
a larger enterprise which has its own history. The moral code is designed to promote 
the purpose of the collective, and defend it from internal decay and external threat. It 
promotes obedience, sacrifice, duty, honour, loyalty, knowing one’s place, courage 
and abstinence. In such societies the moral authority resides outside the individual 
within the collective. Self-esteem is based primarily on the status within the group, 
and the perception of others.  
 
All societies wrestle with the tension between these two opposing ethical codes, and 
which code takes dominance may shift according to circumstance.
160
 For example, in 
individualistic societies during times of external threat the pendulum swings towards 
the collective ideals of loyalty and sacrifice, and individual freedoms may suffer. We 
could view the development of secular Western society as the gradual prioritising of 
the individual over the collective.
161
 In Western Europe, the age of chivalry was all 
about the collective precept, but through the slow infiltration of Enlightenment ideas, 
honour was replaced eventually by dignity, courage by virtue and obedience by 
initiative. Within Western society today, a few groups, such as the military and the 
church, actively promote a collectivist moral code.  
 
A simple example of the different attitudes of collective and individualistic societies 
is hiring practice. In a society with strong collective instincts it would be regarded as 
outrageously disloyal to offer a job to a stranger rather than to a member of one’s own 
circle, whereas in an individualistic culture it would be regarded as discrimination and 
nepotism. 
 
By examining more closely self-respect and how it relates to social behaviour, we 
move into the realm of societies with a strong shame component, guilt component or 
fears about security. 
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Ruth Benedict first introduced the idea of shame-based and guilt-based societies to 
help explain Japanese culture to an American readership. While some theorists have 
rejected this shame / guilt classification
162
 I maintain that it nevertheless remains a 
useful tool to help understand core cultural values. In her definition 
 
true shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behaviour, not, as true 
guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to 
other people’s criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and 
rejected or by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous.163 
 
Benedict presents Japanese society as having a strong shame component, compared to 
a guilt-driven American society. This is not to deny any role of shame in the US, nor 
of guilt in Japanese society, but highlights the cultural tendency of each society. The 
sanction in shame societies is the fear of being discovered transgressing the behaviour 
code. Behaviour tends to become oriented toward the verdict of others, actively 
discouraging non-conformist behaviour. Some writers view shame-based societies in 
a more positive light by stressing the honour aspect of these societies.
164
 In guilt 
societies, the sanction is an internal one, and does not much rely on the judgement of 
others. 
 
Shame driven societies tend to be complex, with many layers of obligations and 
loyalty. The rules of behaviour infiltrate family relationships, the workplace, religious 
affairs and most of the public sphere. These behavioural rules govern the level of 
respect to be shown to those above and below in a hierarchy of social worth. The 
stratified nature of such societies tend to rely on an established set of roles and 
obligations.  
 
Within the category of honour societies there are certain sets of behaviour that are of 
particular relevance to this study of humiliation and violence. In some honour 
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societies, social respect is based on the ability to support and protect one’s family and 
friends. Typically, these societies develop in conditions where state protection is weak 
and wealth easily stolen.
165
 The credible threat of violence or connections to powerful 
friends secures status within the community, and is a major part of social prestige. In 
order to distinguish this set of behaviour codes from the more general case of honour 
societies, I label this as “security based” behaviour, as it is primarily concerned with 
safety and security, often in an anarchic and dangerous social or political 
environment. Those societies where such behaviour dominates the response to threat 
or challenge I call security societies.  
 
Honour societies and security societies share some characteristics in that they both 
rely on the opinion of others for prestige and ultimately self-respect. However they 
can differ in significant ways. In honour societies there is a large range of behaviour 
driven by the regard of others and social norms, whereas in security societies it is 
restricted primarily to the response to threat or implication of weakness. Within 
security societies it can often be the case that revenge is disproportionate to the 
offence, as this increases the deterrence effect. However, within honour societies, the 
level of revenge is often strictly codified, and to break this code would in itself be 
cause for social disapproval.  Also, honour societies are collectivist in nature, whereas 
there are examples of security societies that are quite individualistic. The anarchic 
American “wild west” had an extreme example of a security code. A “don’t mess with 
me” reputation guaranteed respect in a highly individualistic society, whereas the 
Bedouin demands the same respect but within a highly structured collective tribal 
society.
166
  
 
Within honour cultures, any behaviour that challenges the social norm is in itself 
shameful, and if the rank of an individual is questioned the humiliation is immediately 
felt. An aggressive response is required not to avoid humiliation as in security 
societies, but to reverse the already inflicted stain upon one’s character. Within 
hierarchic shame societies, the response to insult must be carefully calibrated so as to 
be at an appropriate level, and not to disturb the hierarchy itself. 
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Shame and security codes can become entwined. Most shame societies have adopted 
some elements of the security code, with some, such as some modern Arab societies 
having strong elements of both. In shame societies the collectivist ethos means that 
status is to a large extent determined by how well one conforms to social norms. 
Prestige can be lost by one’s own nonconformist actions, or by others challenging 
one’s place or role in society. 
 
From the above analysis, we arrive at a rough but nevertheless useful guide to cultural 
differences. Collectivistic cultures tend to be shame based. Individualistic cultures 
tend to be guilt based. However, overriding both these considerations, a weak central 
authority combined with easily stolen economic assets tends to produce a security 
based behaviour code, within either a collectivistic or individualist society. 
 
Now we examine some examples of these cultural types in the context of status, self-
respect, and prestige, and their opposite, humiliation. 
 
Nomadic tribal society 
 
Security societies tend to develop where economic wealth is portable and easily 
stolen, and the state is weak and ineffective in policing theft.
167
 In such circumstances,  
a reputation for toughness is necessary to defend the family’s fortunes. The most 
likely place that security societies develop is in remote uplands, semi-deserts and 
steppes, where animal grazing is the only viable means of support. In these remote 
areas, the state is typically unable to have an effective policing role, and disputes are 
resolved locally. Wealth, in the form of animals, can be rustled away literally 
overnight and easily hidden or sold. Grazing rights are difficult to defend. Honour has 
little to do with good character but is the ability to defend (with violence if necessary) 
insecure economic assets.
168
 In such an environment, a man’s reputation for toughness 
is his most important asset, which must be defended at all costs and against all 
challengers, and relies on a credible threat of violence.  
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Stephane Voell provides a modern example of the honour code re-emerging after the 
collapse of strong centralised state control. He has shown that in Albania the revival 
of the kanun honour code in remote areas has taken over the role of the state as a  
security mechanism providing retributive justice.
169
 
 
The main social grouping in nomadic cultures is the family or small tribe, as thinly-
spread grazing flocks can only support small groups. Sons are required to guard the 
flock, so women as providers of progeny are important resources to be protected and 
jealously guarded. In some nomadic societies, for women to marry outside the 
extended family is regarded as an act of sabotage.
170
 The measure of an honourable 
man is his power to protect and support his extended family, especially the women 
who are to continue the family lineage. In order to survive the harsh conditions of 
nomadic existence, the group must develop behavioural and ethical codes to support 
one another and the group as a whole. Collectivist traits such as loyalty, obedience, 
courage and duty define a clan, extended family or tribe as a strong independent force 
to be respected.
 171
 
 
Pryce-Jones describes a power-challenge culture in tribal societies in which 
dominance is determined by the ability to mount and defeat challenges by force. 
Disputes between neighbouring parties are often resolved through violence or its 
credible threat. 
 
Indeed, violence is an essential ingredient in the process of decision making, it 
is proof of serious intention, of the will to proceed in the group interest, no 
matter what the rights and wrongs.
 172
 
 
In a culture where prestige is based on the reputation of dominating others, it is not a 
challenge or insult itself that is humiliating, but the failure to respond with appropriate 
force. Any sign of weakness implies a loss of prestige and influence. The response is 
judged in terms of effective aggression within the norms of the security culture, and if 
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found wanting, the insulted individual or group is treated with disdain, and is 
humiliated for not responding forcefully enough. Within limits, the more forceful the 
response, the more respect is granted. The culture itself compels those who have been 
insulted to respond aggressively and confront those who malign their reputation, even 
if there is little chance of success. From the above discussion it follows that the males 
especially are always on the alert for behaviour they can construe as demeaning to 
them or their family because their reputation relies on their ability to respond 
aggressively to defend their honour. 
 
In such societies one cannot back down from a conflict without loss of reputation and 
hence influence. So it makes sense to take care not to offend others one regards as 
dangerously volatile. There are strong codes of etiquette and politeness to ensure that 
social behaviour does not accidentally spill over into conflict. Such societies mostly 
have the reputation of being polite and friendly places, but if offence is taken this can 
change very quickly. 
 
The Bedouin core of Arab society 
 
As populations urbanised, the security culture moved to the cities and either adapted 
to the more densely populated urban environment, or became subsumed into the larger 
culture. Patai observes that within Arab society the Bedouin ethos of blood revenge 
has survived in the urban society.
173
 
 
Arab society still has at its core Bedouin values. Today the Bedouins make up less 
than 10% of the Arab population
174
, yet have a significant influence as the perceived 
guardians of the Arab ethos. As outlined by Patai, this ethos includes hospitality, 
generosity, courage, honour, and self-respect.
175
 Within Arab society, self-respect is a 
reflection of the respect afforded by others, and is judged according to how well an 
individual conforms to society’s mores. This represents an honour society. Also, the 
harsh nomadic existence of the Bedouin leads to aspects of the security code being 
adopted, as described in the previous section. 
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Ahmed Abou-Zeid describes the effect of the honour code of the Bedouins of the 
Western Desert as follows:  
 
A slight offence inflicted against a lineage or a lineage-segment is taken as an 
unforgivable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, 
regain honour and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups. 
This strict defence of honour stands as a guarantee against misconduct and 
unjustified aggression. The fear that the offended group will retaliate with 
violence is an effective check on the behaviour of individuals  and groups alike. 
On the other hand, the shame which strikes an aggressor or culprit and the 
consequent humiliation he brings on himself as well as on his kin-group is an 
additional factor in regulating social behaviour.176 
 
The influence of the Bedouin over the Arab moral code is complex and not easily 
distilled to a simple cause and effect. However, the sensitivity to any infringement of 
their honour is reflected in the Bedouin code, and is internalised in Arab culture as 
extreme pride combined with a wariness of any possible challenge.
177
 A recent 
example is of an Iraqi soldier shooting US  troops after being slapped. “The Iraqi 
Interior Ministry said the soldier opened fire after he had been publicly slapped by an 
American colleague. Many Iraqi men, especially in the military, are intensely proud 
and conscious of any perceived slight to their honour.”
178
 
 
Fontan portrays the three aspects of honour in Arab culture as sharaf, ihtaram and 
ird.
179
 Sharaf refers to social class either through birth or through acts of nobility, 
benevolence and hospitality. Ihtaram refers to respect gained through the use or 
credible threat of physical force. Ird represents the preservation of a woman’s purity. 
The purity of a woman is crucial to the honour of her family, and a woman perceived 
to be sexually deviant (which includes being raped) can sometimes be killed in order 
to cleanse the family honour..  
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Glidden describes a major attribute of prestige in the Arab value system as the ability 
to dominate others, the ihtiram aspect of honour.
180
 Shame is reversed through 
revenge. The need for revenge remains strong in Arab society. For example, in Egypt, 
of 1070 cases of murder, 20% were based on a desire to wipe out shame, 30% to 
avenge real or imaginary wrongs and 31% on blood revenge.
181
 In Coleman’s 
terminology, it would seem that a shamed male is not only entitled to seek revenge 
(privilege) but is expected to do so (obligation).
182
 
 
I contend that within an urban environment where there is weak central control, 
security is based on violence or its credible threat, just as in the rural environment 
described above. The family head can extend his support and protection to his 
associates and friends, and so increases his prestige, security and his sphere of 
influence. These extended families in some societies can become powerful clans and 
wield significant political and social influence.
183
 In an anarchic system, smaller 
players ally themselves with those who can protect and support them. They offer 
allegiance to those groups that have the reputation for vigorously defending their turf 
and their people, thus increasing their power and influence further. Eventually large 
powerful families or honour groupings tend to dominate the social and political 
landscape. For example, the historian Salah Khalaf writes about Lebanon: 
 
The whole political history of Lebanon may be viewed as the history of a 
handful of leading families competing to affirm their name, power and prestige 
in their respective communities.184 
 
As it is regarded as the duty of extended families and clans to look after their own, it 
follows that that nepotism and diversion of public funds are common in such 
societies. Government office is primarily a means of securing the interests of the 
family or clan, often at the expense of other sections of society. 
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The security code combined with a collectivist ethos produces a type of multiplier 
effect when responding to challenges of power or security. If an individual is 
challenged, his honour is at stake. Within a collectivist society this honour is also 
shared and reflected amongst his intimate acquaintances and family group, so it is not 
just one person being challenged. Nor is it just one person doing the challenging, but 
the challenger is seen as a representative of a family or clan or other power group that 
is attempting to assert themselves at the other’s expense. The ethos of loyalty and 
courage means “we are all in this together” and unless a mediator can expedite a face 
saving formula for both sides, it can easily spiral out of control and into violence. The 
group nature of the interaction makes it much more difficult for either side to back 
down, as the protagonists must not only show the other side that they must not be 
underestimated, but also it is crucial to prove to one’s own side that one is tough 
enough to justify the group’s support and respect. 
 
The European link 
 
Europe has a strong tradition of honour culture associated with violence. The stories 
of the chivalric knights of  the Middle Ages showed combat being used to settle 
questions of virtue, and the concern for reputation overriding actual behaviour.  
 
In a later age, duelling was used not only to resolve moral disputes, but also to wash 
away in blood, stains on one’s reputation. A slap in the face was a humiliation that 
demanded the formalised violence of the duelling sword or pistol. Pitt-Rivers believed 
that such ritualised violence was endowed with divine sanction, as God would not 
support a perjurer or scoundrel in combat.
185
 Duelling was part of the social fabric of 
the aristocratic classes up to the early 19
th
 century. Even one of the most liberal and 
forward thinking of the American Founders, Alexander Hamilton, felt obliged to 
accept a duel and was killed in 1804. He believed that if he refused, his public 
standing would be compromised.
186
 
 
As early as the beginning of the 18
th
 century, notions of honour start to take on 
aspects of an internal dignity rather than merely public reputation. Consider Addison, 
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quoted in Bowman.
187
 He believed it more honourable to forgive rather than avenge 
an insult, and to guard reputation with virtue rather than courage. 
 
This move away from the importance of public reputation relieved the pressure to 
avenge insults, and allowed the possibility of Christian forgiveness. Also, the 
Enlightenment brought with it concepts of equality, which to some extent undermined 
the entitlement to demote challengers to a lower place in the social hierarchy, or even 
kill them. 
 
The changing nature of war also worked to undermine the honour culture. When 
World War One started, the volunteer armies were full of enthusiasm for defending 
the honour of their country, and in the case of the British, the honesty, pluck and fair 
play they believed it represented. By the end of the war, after a generation of young 
men was almost wiped out in the slaughter of the trenches, there was enormous 
disillusionment with warfare and violence as a means of settling questions of honour. 
John Ellis writes 
 
If a machine gun could wipe out a battalion of men in three minutes, where was 
the relevance of the old concepts of heroism, glory and fair play between 
gentlemen? … In a war in which death was dealt out to so many with such 
mechanical casualness how could the old traditional modes of thought 
survive?
188
 
 
Some of the changes in Western society regarding acceptable behaviour concerning 
honour have been quite recent. It was only in 2005 that provocation was removed as a 
defence against murder in the Australian state of Victoria. Acting Premier John 
Thwaites said “the law of provocation was an anachronism that no longer had a place 
in a modern, civilised society. . .  [I]t had been created when … it was acceptable for 
men to have a violent response to a breach of their honour. . . judges would still be 
able to take provocation into account during sentencing”.
189
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However, honour culture still exists today within Europe. For example, consider 
omerta, the code of honour of Southern Italy and Sicily, and note the security ethos of 
retributive justice it entails :  
 
Whoever appeals to the law against his fellow man is either a fool or a coward. 
Whoever cannot take care of himself without police protection is both. It is as 
cowardly to betray an offender to justice, even though his offences be against 
yourself, as it is not to avenge an injury by violence. It is dastardly and 
contemptible in a wounded man to betray the name of his assailant, because if 
he recovers, he must naturally expect to take vengeance himself.190 
 
In some Western cities, the gang and drug-dealing culture has a strong security 
element. In order to get respect you have to be tough. The law does not get involved, 
and so disputes are resolved through force or its credible threat. The sociologist Peter 
Moskos describes the drug-dealing culture in Baltimore. 
 
You hang out with your friends. People “respect” (i.e. fear) you. You project 
glamour. You get laid. You also become otherwise unemployable…To survive 
on the street you learn to react violently and pre-emptively to the slightest 
challenge. This is a useful trait for a drug-dealer, but, oddly, managers at 
Starbucks do not value it.191 
 
Also, Mosquera has made a study of how honour and individualistic values affect 
shame, anger and pride by comparing the cultures of Spain and the Netherlands.
192
 He 
and his colleagues asked Spanish and Dutch participants to imagine how they would 
respond to prepared vignettes involving shame, pride and anger situations which also 
varied the extent to which friends and family were involved. The results of the anger 
vignettes, in which the participant was to imagine being insulted in front of others, 
showed that the Spanish, part of a more honour-bound society, were much more 
likely to feel anger than the Dutch, who are more individualistic.
193
 Mosquera also 
found that the more honour-bound individuals reacted more aggressively when 
insulted by members of their own circle. 
Once again, we see signs that intimate others play a crucial role in offense 
situations. We suggest that this relates to the strong interdependence between 
one’s own honor and the honor of intimate others in honor cultures. This has 
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two important consequences. First, one’s own honor is more vulnerable to 
humiliations and insults by intimates than by nonintimates, leading to angrier 
feelings and a stronger need to restore one’s honor. Second, being offended by 
others in front of intimates may lead to more negative feelings, especially of 
shame, in honor cultures than in nonhonor cultures because one’s own honor has 
implications for the honor of intimate others: If the self is offended and one’s 
honor is thereby diminished, the honor of one’s intimates also will be 
diminished.
194
 
 
While this study did not go as far as Nisbett’s (described below) in looking at 
violence, the link between honour and how it generates anger points to a link between 
insult and violence in European honour societies. 
 
The American South 
 
As well as in parts of Europe, the honour culture is alive and well in the American 
South. Nisbett and Cohen carried out a series of experiments comparing Southerners 
and Northerners in the US in their reaction to honour and insult.
195
 The results 
dramatically confirm that there is a regional culture of honour associated with 
violence in the US. 
 
Nisbett and Cohen examined white non-hispanic male violence in the South, and 
compared it with the North using a number of different methods and indicators. In 
questionnaires Southerners were more opposed to violence in general than 
Northerners but when asked whether a man has the right to kill in self-defence or 
protect his family or defend his house, the Southerners were much more likely to 
support violence. Also Southerners were more likely to support punching someone 
who insults them. Questionnaires also showed that Southerners were much more 
likely to support shooting someone who sexually assaults their daughter or steals their 
wife.
196
 
 
The culture of gun ownership in the South coupled with the culture of honour leads to 
an extremely dangerous environment. Nisbett and Cohen spell this out : 
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In a culture where honor is so important, arguments lead to affronts that demand 
retribution. The availability of guns increases the chance that the retribution 
may be deadly. In addition, the knowledge that the other person may be armed 
and may begin acting violently may lead to pre-emptive first strikes. Once 
conflicts escalate, a man may be more apt to take a first strike as a matter of 
self-protection before he himself gets shot.197 
 
They also carried out experiments with students from the South and from the North 
and compared their reactions to having their physical space intruded upon by being 
“bumped” in a corridor. The anger ratings were much higher for the Southerners. 
Perhaps more significantly, Southerners’ cortisol and testosterone levels rose 
dramatically after an insult, while Northerners’ levels were hardly affected. Cortisol is 
a hormone associated with stress and anxiety, and testosterone is associated with 
aggression and dominance. The result of these experiments lead Nisbett and Cohen to 
observe that “for the Southerner, the insult has something to do with himself and his 
reputation; for the Northerner the insult has something to do only with the person who 
delivered the insult”.
198
 This shows the extent to which those in honour societies, such 
as the American South, are more generally on their guard, even at a physiological 
level, to defend their reputation that is so hard won yet can be lost in a single incident. 
 
Nisbett and Cohen also examined a range of social policy measures in the South, and 
compared them to those in Northern states. They analysed gun control; defence of 
home and property; attitudes towards domestic violence; corporal punishment at home 
and school; and capital punishment. The results were striking. In all the above cases, 
the legal and social policies of the South were more pro-violent than the Northern 
states.
199
 
 
Nisbett and Cohen also sent out letters to employers across the country inquiring 
about a job. In the letter, the “applicant” admitted a conviction for manslaughter for 
killing in defence of his honour when provoked by a man claiming to have slept with 
his fiancée. Southern employers responded more favourably to the “honour” version 
of the letter than an otherwise identical control letter.
200
 
 
                                                
197
 Ibid., 38. 
198
 Ibid., 41-53. 
199
 Ibid., 57-73. 
200 Ibid., 73-75. 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 3 
80 of 118 
The American South as described by Nisbett and Cohen shows that the concern for 
security of family and property, combined with a sense of being judged by others, 
produces a very strong security culture. The approval of certain types of violence that 
support these security concerns appears to be built into Southern culture. Laws that 
support aggressive defence of reputation, property and family, use of corporal 
punishment for socialising children, and the high incidence of capital punishment are 
all indicators of a security culture sanctioning the selective use of private and social 
violence. Not surprisingly, leaders in the South during the American Civil War rallied 
support by appealing to the sense of Southern honour.
201
 The use of violence as 
defence against insult plays a crucial part in this social dynamic. 
 
Role of the status group 
 
In order to consider how humiliation plays out within different types of societies, 
consider the status group. I define this as the group of people whose opinion of the 
status of an individual matters to that person. The group can be family, work 
colleagues, professional associates, sporting fraternity, local church or voluntary 
organisation. 
 
Societies that stress the role of the individual tend to be diverse. There are many ways 
for an individual to interact with others. Community organisations, professional 
groups, sporting clubs, cultural societies provide different status groups. With many 
status groups, a person can develop a sense of belonging and respect from many areas 
of public life. Being a worker, having a family, playing in a band or supporting a team 
all provide different ways to participate in a group and develop a sense of self and of 
self-respect. Each status group has its own set of codes and ideals, and no one status 
group has a monopoly on the social prestige of the individual. Hence loss of status 
within one status group need not affect an individual’s status within other groups, and 
the social and psychic damage can be limited, though this may not be so true for 
public personalities such as politicians or celebrities. Although humiliated within one 
social sphere, it may even be possible to gain some support within others “my family 
supports me during these troubled times”, or “my colleagues continue to express their 
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support”. An insult or humiliation is less likely to lead to complete social 
abandonment, and so is less threatening. 
 
There is another mitigating effect. In societies that stress the dignity of the self, such 
as the individualistic societies of Northern America and some Northern European 
countries, the opinion of others is not as crucial to self-respect as in the more 
collective societies, so loss of respect in the eyes of others is not such a strong factor. 
Humiliation is less likely to be felt, and to be less intense when it occurs. 
 
Within collective societies the status group is large and all-embracing. It is the tribe, 
social caste or extended family with very little else in terms of civic society. Disgrace 
within such a society is more difficult to deal with, as there are very few support 
structures for those who fail to conform to the collective ideals. The fear of being an 
outcast means that any stain of ridicule or disgrace must be washed away 
immediately, usually through an aggressive response. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Within different types of societies, insult and humiliation lead to aggression and 
sometimes violence for different reasons and with different intensities. In honour 
societies, one’s prestige is built on the opinion of others, so where such a culture 
demands an aggressive response, it must be forthcoming. Security societies, such as 
mountain nomads and the American South, are built around the credible threat of 
violence as a deterrent against loss of insecure economic assets, so any insult must be 
dealt with decisively. Some Arab societies represent a mix of both honour and 
security moral codes, and feel humiliation more keenly than most.
202
 Individualistic 
societies, such as North America and Northern Europe, provide more diverse status 
groups, lessening the psychological impact of insulting behaviour and also the need 
for revenge. 
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These cultural factors play an important part in the social dynamics of Gaza, which I 
examine in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Gaza case study 
 
The economic, political and social situation in Gaza lends itself easily to many 
theories of collective violence outlined in Chapter 1. Many factors play a part in 
Gazan society including frustration, relative and absolute deprivation, inability to 
resolve grievances through peaceful means and unmet human needs. All these 
theoretical frameworks can be used as a lens to analyse the Israeli Palestine conflict in 
Gaza, but I propose that there are other psychoanalytical aspects to this conflict, 
including revenge as part of the social narrative, social trauma and unresolved 
mourning. The situation in Gaza also provides a fertile area for exploring the concepts 
of humiliation, group trauma, demonisation of the enemy and the entitlements that 
come from a sense of victimhood, and how they relate to violence. It is not my 
contention that this view should take precedence over other ways of viewing the 
conflict, but would rather add to an understanding of the social forces at work. 
 
Both the Jews of Israel and the Palestinians have been subjected to intense social 
trauma – the Nazi Holocaust and the Palestinian expulsion of 1948. Each keeps their 
trauma at the forefront of their social identity. The Jews talk of “never again”, and the 
Palestinians “the return”.  
 
Each side believes that ultimately their fate lies in their own hands. The Jews 
remember how the world looked the other way during the Holocaust, and many 
believe it would again if access to Arab oil made international intervention 
inconvenient. Similarly, Palestinians realise that their fate is of little practical interest 
to the surrounding Arab states, and see Arab leaders shaking hands with the West.  
 
Both sides demonise the other and have an image of the other that primarily 
represents the more extreme elements of the other’s society. The only Israelis most 
Palestinians come into contact with are soldiers in the Israeli army or the settlers in 
Palestinian areas. Similarly most Israelis only come into contact with Palestinians as 
either uneducated day labourers or perpetrators of violence.  
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In this chapter I discuss the concept of victimhood from first the Israeli point of view, 
and then the Palestinian. This is followed by a short historical discussion of events 
before a more complete discussion of the conditions in the Occupied Territories up to 
2008. The last part of the chapter discusses how resistance organisations, such as 
Hamas, provide a social and psychological framework for Gazans, especially the 
disaffected youth, to avenge their perceived humiliations often through violence. 
 
In the following analysis, the description of events in the conflict is taken from a 
number of sources.
203
 There is a chronology of major events, taken from these 
sources, at the end of the chapter. 
 
As at 2008, Gaza’s population was 1.5 million, of which 99.3% is Muslim 
(predominantly Sunni), and 0.7% Christian. The Jewish settlements there were 
disbanded in 2005. Most of the Christian Palestinians in the Occupied Territories live 
in the West Bank. Of Israel’s population of around 7 million, approximately 75% are 
Jewish, 17% are Muslim, and the rest Christian, Druze and other religious groups.
204
 
Within this thesis, reference to Israelis usually refers to Jewish Israelis. 
 
Victimhood (and its entitlements) 
 
Both sides view themselves as the victim in the situation. The Palestinians are under a 
harsh occupation, having been driven from their lands. The Israelis see themselves as 
a tiny nation surrounded by hostile neighbours threatening to drive them into the sea, 
while being subjected to suicide bombings and violent attacks. 
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Victimhood is the psychological state that comes with being subjected to an extreme 
or persistent low level sense of mortal vulnerability. Montville claims that this 
depends on at least three factors: 
1. The victim or someone close to them must have suffered physical or 
psychological violence. 
2. The violence is felt to be unjustified by almost any standard. The victim 
knows that civil and human rights are being violated 
3. The assault is part of a continuous threat that generates a fear of 
annihilation.
205
 
 
The psychology of victimhood has two important outcomes. Firstly, the victims 
become aware that passivity ensures victimisation.
206
 Unless they respond forcefully, 
they will continue to be victimised. Secondly, the “egoism of victimisation”, best 
described by Mack, allows for no recognition of suffering by the enemy:  
 
The egoism of victimization is the incapacity of an ethno-national group, as a 
direct result of its own historical traumas, to empathize with the suffering of 
another group. It is analogous to the narcissism or self-centredness of some 
individuals who see themselves as having been so hurt or deprived in the past 
that they can attend only to their own needs, feeling little or no empathy for the 
hurt they inflict on others. 207 
 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict demonstrates the dynamics of victimhood being 
played out by both sides.  
Jewish Victimhood : the Holocaust 
 
An important aspect of humiliation is the feeling of a lack of control, of being helpless 
and at the mercy of your enemy. The Holocaust was an extreme case of deep 
humiliation and helplessness for the Jews of Europe. The Jewish Israelis have the 
threat of annihilation built into their psyche, and are continually reminded of the 
precariousness of their situation when Arabs refuse to recognise their right to exist 
and threaten to wipe them out. After the Nazi Holocaust, the threat of extermination 
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for many Jews takes on enormous emotional and psychological significance. What 
may appear to some as overblown rhetoric, the Arab threat to “push Israel into the 
sea” reawakens annihilation anxiety, and brings to the fore the determination not to be 
passive in the face of the enemy. Many Jewish Israelis recognise that Jews have in the 
past paid a terrible price for passivity, and an essential part of the Israeli ethos is that 
“this time we fight”. Shalit argues that Zionism offered an alternative identity of 
strength and power that appeals to the Jewish psyche.
208
 With the safe haven from the 
expulsions and mob attacks of the past being under threat, the defence of Israel takes 
on an existential urgency.   
 
When Israel was declared a new state in 1948, the Israelis defeated the combined 
armies of the surrounding Arab states that attempted to destroy the fledgling Israeli 
nation. For many Jews, this victory defined a new identity; the Jew who isn’t going to 
get pushed around any more, the Jew who does whatever is necessary to defend the 
safe haven, as there is nowhere left to run to. This annihilation anxiety released a 
determination and a fervour to repel the attack. The fact that many Palestinians were 
expelled from their homes, and villages destroyed was unfortunate, but larger 
considerations were at stake. One third of all Jewry was killed in the Nazi death 
camps, and a strong Israel must exist to ensure that cannot happen again. This attitude 
reflects the “ego of victimhood” that Mack refers to, where there is little emotional 
empathy with the suffering of the enemy if one assumes the mantle of victimhood.
209
  
 
Many believe that the Jewish experience of Holocaust lies behind the harsh treatment 
the Palestinians suffer, and there may well be an element of truth in this. Berel Lang, 
for example, finds it relevant that there has been little in the way of revenge against 
the German nation, and posits that there is an element of displaced revenge against the 
Arabs. 
 
I would argue that at least in degree, certain disfigured representations of Arab 
character and rights -- and the expression of self-assertion and force directed 
against those representations -- reflect an emergence from powerlessness that in 
recent Jewish history was epitomized in the Shoah and that has since found in 
                                                
208
 Erel Shalit, "The Relationship between Aggression and Fear of Annihilation in Israel," Political 
Psychology 15, no. 3 (1994). In brief, Zionism is a movement started by European Jewry to establish a 
Jewish homeland, in response to persecution and pogroms during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. 
209 Mack, "The Psychodynamics of Victimization among National Groups in Conflict." 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 4 
87 of 118 
the Arabs an available target for compensation -- that is, for revenge. 
Discussion, for example, of the "transfer" of the Arab population recalls that 
earlier precedent both substantively and in its perversion of language. A more 
superficial but also more obvious manifestation of this tendency appears in the 
slogan "Never again," with the "again" an obvious invocation of the Shoah, 
directed now, however, not against Nazis but their successors. (A notable 
variation on the latter was Menachem Begin's justification to the Israeli cabinet 
on the eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982: "The alternative is 
Treblinka, and we have decided there will be no more Treblinkas.")210 
 
Donald Neff describes the “ego of victimhood” syndrome in his analysis of how the 
1967 war was reported: 
 
With only a few notable exceptions, stories coming out of Israel and printed in 
the major US dailies during this period were almost invariably focused on the 
glory of Israel’s achievements and the humanity of its occupation policies. They 
were mute about the plight of a people suddenly rendered captive or homeless in 
their own land, silent now that victims of the past had suddenly become 
oppressors of the present. This blindness to a whole people’s suffering and the 
unrestrained glorification of Israel was widely shared and partly explained by 
the lingering Holocaust guilt of the West. The Christian West experienced a 
sense of relief, of expiation, with Israel’s triumph. There was in the West an 
undercurrent of feeling that finally its guilt over the Nazi atrocities was at last 
exculpated.211 
 
But still there is the underlying fear, here described by Shipler: 
 
That essential feel for the trauma, the tragedy, the aloneness of the Jews in that 
dark period is simply missing from the Arabs’ sense of history and from their 
grasp of the present. And therefore they cannot understand Israel. They cannot 
understand the fierce sensations of vulnerability, the lusty devotion to military 
strength, the stubborn resistance to international criticism, the waves of guilt 
that soften the core of the hardness. They cannot comprehend the gnawing fear 
of powerlessness that grinds beneath the arsenal of tanks and planes, the lurking 
conviction that it could happen again, and that again the world would look the 
other way.
212
 
 
Palestinian Victimhood : the Expulsion of 1948 
 
The expulsion of 1948 was a devastating and traumatic event for the Palestinians. 
Many fled to Egypt-controlled Gaza, but were not granted Egyptian citizenship. 
Unlike millions of  refugees in the 1940s in the aftermath of World War Two and the 
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Hindu / Moslem conflict in India, the Palestinians have been unable to find a new 
home. The Arab League passed a decree in 1949 that no Arab state should offer 
citizenship to a Palestinian or their descendants.
213
 While the decree’s intention was to 
avoid dissolution of their identity and protect their right of return, it effectively made 
Palestinians incapable of settling anywhere. The “right of return” to Palestine has 
since become an integral part of the Palestinian identity. The Palestinian historian Abd 
al-Latif Tibawi describes the intensity of the emotion regarding the ‘return’. 
 
It embraces not only those adults, men and women, and their children who are 
now homeless, but also children of refugees born in exile. All are being 
thoroughly and systematically instructed in the mystique of ‘the return’ in 
schools and through all the modern media of communications.214 
 
The Palestinians are placed in a situation where it is impossible for them to come to 
terms with the loss of their homeland. The inability to settle elsewhere in the region 
and the continued occupation of the refugee camps mean that they are constantly 
reminded of their loss.
215
 Not only that, but their daily lives revolve around the 
implications of that loss, and their identity as an ethnic group is defined by it. Many 
Palestinians pass on the key of their original home down the generations as a token or 
symbol of the right of return.
216
 Young Gazans feel they belong to villages they have 
never seen.
217
 The loss of homes and homeland has been described by Said Farhain 
 
People hang on to their homes like snails to their shells. When people have to 
leave their home, there is a scar at that very place where people and walls met so 
closely.
218
 
 
It is probably better described as a scab rather than a scar – a scab that is continually 
worried and picked at, and never heals, especially when Israeli bulldozers destroy 
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Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories.
219
 In this way the losses of the 
expulsion are continually refreshed in the minds of the Palestinians, and the past 
trauma made fresh again.  
 
Edward Said believes the mutual recognition of suffering of the Holocaust and of the 
expulsions of 1948 is part of the necessary basis for coexistence of Israelis and 
Palestinians.
220
 The experiences of both are connected, and must be acknowledged as 
such for there to be any progress. He expresses the frustrations of a society that sees 
no future for itself, and accepts no responsibility for its own development, stuck in 
victimhood and mourning for a lost land.
 221
 
 
Said is describing the symptoms of 
unresolved mourning, and his plea for the trauma of expulsion to be acknowledged as 
such recognises the healing processes associated with mourning. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Volkan describes the process of chosen trauma, and how the 
psychological responsibility to reverse the group’s humiliation is passed down the 
generations.
222
 The example of the Palestinians fits well with his theory of 
generational revenge transmission. The Palestinian demography adds a chilling edge 
to this conclusion. Over half the population is under the age of fifteen, and will be 
growing up in an atmosphere of unresolved humiliation.
223
 
 
Hassan Salameh, a member of Hamas, was asked by Jessica Stern whether he feels 
remorse for lost lives in suicide attacks.
 
“The terrible things that have happened to the 
Palestinian people are far bigger and far stronger than feeling sorry or guilty. As a 
Palestinian, I feel that my people and I have been murdered in the soul by the Israeli 
occupation”. He is expressing clearly Mack’s “ego of victimhood”.
224
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There is another aspect of this dual trauma that emerged from a TRT (To Relate and 
Trust) session between Palestinians and Jews.
225
 While both sides related their sense 
of being a victim, it emerged that some Palestinians felt that the Holocaust somehow 
devalued their own problems, and that the portrayal of trauma became a type of 
competition that they were destined to lose. Yet another cause for resentment. 
 
After the 1948 war 
 
The next major war after 1948 was the Six Day War in 1967; a humiliating defeat for 
the surrounding Arab states. Rather than wiping Israel off the map, the result was the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and the Sinai. In 1967, 
the threat of annihilation, or death anxiety, Shalit believes, led to a release of 
tremendous strength that saved the Israeli nation. This victory led to a sense of 
grandiosity and omnipotence, confirming the sense of historical destiny.
226
 
 
The Yom Kippur war of 1973 caught Israel unprepared for the attack by Syrian and 
Egyptian forces. Eventually it was repulsed, but both sides suffered heavy losses. The 
initial success of the operation restored the Arabs’ sense of honour, and damaged the 
myth of invincibility of the Israeli forces. After the war Sadat managed to break a 
negotiation deadlock by coming to Israel to address the Knesset. "The Arab-Israeli 
conflict," he later told a U.S. Congressman, "contains 70% psychological problems 
and 30% substance."
227
  This extraordinary political gamble lead to the Camp David 
Accords of 1978, in which Egypt and Israel normalised relations. The implicit 
recognition of Israel isolated Egypt within the Arab world, and was seen as a betrayal 
by the Palestinians.
228
 The Camp David accord only allowed for Palestinian 
autonomy, not statehood, and was subsidiary to the main purpose of the treaty. 
 
While the major themes of Arab wars and agreements were being played out on the 
international stage, a guerrilla war was taking place within and outside Israel during 
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the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The various Palestinian factions were intent on damaging 
Israel and terrorising Israelis. The Palestinian attacks included bus bombings and 
hostage taking within Israel; rocket attacks; multiple airline hijackings; the Munich 
Olympics massacre; the airport massacres at Lod
229
, Athens, Vienna and Rome; and 
the hijack of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. The Israeli response was often 
disproportionate, and sometimes in the form of collective punishment. Israel retaliated 
with raids on Palestinians and their supporters, including targeted assassinations, 
bombardment of refugee camps, blowing up 13 Arab aircraft at Beirut airport in 1968, 
and bombing the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) headquarters in Tunis in 
1985. While Abu-Sharif maintains that one reason for the attacks was to gain 
publicity for the Palestinian cause
230
, the resulting reprisals, often heavy-handed to act 
as a deterrent, would have added to the sense of helplessness and outrage felt by 
moderate Palestinians. 
 
The Occupation and Intifada. 
 
Occupation aims, at its core, to deny Palestinians their humanity by denying 
them the right to determine their existence, to live normal lives in their own 
homes. Occupation is humiliation. It is despair and desperation.231 
 
The Israeli occupation of the territories gained in the 1967 war provided the 
Palestinians with many reasons for resentment. The Israeli Civil Administration 
within Gaza presents them with constant day-to-day  humiliations, as the above quote 
demonstrates. Stern quotes from Israeli reporters Schiff and Ya’ari: 
 
Since the occupation began, Palestinians have been at the mercy of the Israeli 
Civil Administration in every sphere of economic life. Each requirement for a 
permit, grant or dispensation entailed an exhausting wrestle with a crabbed 
bureaucracy of mostly indifferent but sometimes hostile clerks and officials – a 
veritable juggernaut of four hundred Jewish mandarins managing thousands of 
Arab minions bereft of all authority.232 
 
                                                
229
 By the Japanese Red Army on behalf of a Palestinian faction. 
230
 Bassam Abu-Sharif and Uzi Mahnaimi, Best of Enemies (Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 87-88. 
231
 Sara Roy, Failing Peace. Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 22.  
232 Stern, Terror in the Name of God : Why Religious Militants Kill, 37. 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Chapter 4 
92 of 118 
All travel is severely restricted by checkpoints throughout the Occupied Territories, 
and at the entry points and exit points. The simplest of journeys can be delayed by 
apparently arbitrary searches. Here is an account of a Palestinian travelling to Gaza: 
 
The endless lines of other travellers and children, waiting for the unwelcoming 
and belligerent faces of their occupiers to place a single stamp in their travel 
document giving them approval to return to their home; or to arbitrarily 
interrogate them; imprison them; or deny them entry. The strip searches.
 233
 
 
The checkpoints are one of the most hated practices within the Occupied Territories.  
 
Checkpoint stories abound among Palestinians. The Israeli human rights group 
B'Tselem has documented the cases of 19 Palestinian civilians shot dead without 
provocation at roadblocks. There have been many cases of Palestinian 
ambulances being blocked from reaching patients and of pregnant or ill 
Palestinians being barred from hospitals. 
 
For many Palestinians, the main problem is more mundane. Checkpoints have 
driven up the price of goods and transport. Journeys of a few miles now take 
hours, as Palestinians skirt the roadblocks on mud roads. The roadblocks 
prevent students getting to college and adults getting to work.
234
 
 
The checkpoints highlight the humiliating aspect of the occupation. They demonstrate 
that the occupying force has control over the daily lives of the Palestinians. The 
checkpoint procedure appears arbitrary: the same person is allowed through one day 
but not another. ID is demanded but not checked against a blacklist, cars are stopped 
but not searched. But always there is the waiting. Sometimes the humiliation is 
obvious: young men have to stand for hours with their hands on their heads before 
being turned back, others are bullied in front of their children.
235
 While the Israelis 
claim the checkpoints serve to increase security, the anger they generate radicalises 
the Palestinian population, and makes checkpoints the target for attacks. This of 
course makes the soldiers there more nervous and thus more likely to overreact to 
anything suspicious, inciting yet more anger. 
 
For many Palestinians, earning a living is at the mercy of the Israelis. While it is 
possible for Palestinians to work in Israel and sell their produce there, the frequent 
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closures of the border checkpoints and travel restrictions emphasise the fragility and 
the one-sidedness of the economic bond. All goods into and out of the Gaza Strip are 
subject to Israeli checkpoints. Thus the Palestinians feel that they at the mercy of their 
oppressors for even food, fuel and other basic necessities. While Israelis are 
concerned about security issues, the Palestinians feel their livelihoods are being held 
hostage. 
 
The frustration engendered by 20 years of occupation, no improvements in conditions 
and collective punishments for attacks on Israelis led to the Intifada of 1987. “The 
uprising was a universal outburst of suppressed dismay, frustration and anger against 
economic exploitation, land expropriation, daily harassment, Jewish settlements and 
the sense of no escape from a long-endured occupation.”
236
 The Palestinians were 
taking matters into their own hands, no longer reliant on apparently unconcerned Arab 
states or a weakened and distant PLO. There was also the need to assert control. 
Living under an occupation where daily life is subject to the whims of the occupying 
force robs people of self-esteem. The intifada was an outlet for the Palestinans’ need 
to assert themselves, to be in charge of their own lives. The violence was both 
expressive of the internal need to take independent action, and instrumental in pushing 
the Israelis to reconsider their policies. 
 
Sucharov believes that the Palestinians throwing stones in the Intifada was too close 
to the narrative of David and Goliath, and made many Israelis realise that the IDF’s 
(Israeli Defence Force) Goliath role was incompatible with that of the “defensive 
warrior”. She argues that this contradiction ultimately lead to the Israeli willingness to 
sign the Oslo accords.
237
 
 
Some Israelis, however, reacted with righteous indignation to the stone throwing, and 
felt anger for being stoned for who they were, rather than for what they had done, 
presumably unaware of the irony of Israeli policy condoning collective punishment.
238
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The intifada was met with a harsh response, with extreme harassment, arbitrary arrest 
and violent repression in order to crush it. This included closure of schools, sealing 
and demolition of houses, destruction of olive and fruit trees, destruction of furniture, 
verbal and physical abuse, and the beating of fathers in front of their children.
239
  
 
The Oslo accords of 1993 appeared at first to be a real chance for peace. The 
Palestinians celebrated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza city and other 
urban areas, and many Israelis were optimistic about the future.
240
 However, the 
accords suffered the fate of many phased agreements – the time and opportunity it 
gave for extremists on both sides to undermine it. Settler violence increased, as they 
feared that even limited self-rule would compromise their position, and threaten 
Israel’s sovereignty over all of Palestine. Hamas stepped up their attacks as they 
opposed the accord because it failed to promise Palestinian statehood, address the 
problem of refugees or the status of Jerusalem. With the assassination of Rabin in 
1995 and the new prime minister Netanyahu being opposed to the agreement, it 
degenerated into angry recriminations about compliance. Some Palestinians believe 
Oslo made the PLO an arm of the Israeli state, by making it responsible for containing 
the anger of its own people without Palestinians getting anything substantial in 
return.
241
  
 
In 2000, a number of events combined to feed the anger, hope and desperation of the 
second intifada. In May the steady stream of casualties inflicted by Hezbollah forced 
the Israelis to withdraw from southern Lebanon, setting a precedent for the success of 
guerrilla warfare against the IDF. In July, Arafat returned from Camp David empty-
handed from failed peace talks. This further discredited the PLO as there had been no 
improvement in the plight of the Palestinians since Oslo.
242
 Soon after Palestinians 
mourned the 18
th
 anniversary of the Sabra and Chatilla massacres
243
, for which many 
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held Ariel Sharon responsible, Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. This 
provocative act provided the spark for the second intifada. During the civil unrest 
from 2000 to 2005 in both the West Bank and Gaza approximately 3000 Palestinians 
and 1000 Israelis died.
244
 Attacks by Palestinians were met by reprisals by the IDF 
including targeted assassinations, destruction of infrastructure in Gaza, demolition of 
homes and other collective punishment. After five years of violence on both sides the 
Sharm-el-Sheik agreement of 2005 lead to the withdrawal of all military forces from 
Gaza, and all the settlements in Gaza and some in the West Bank were evacuated. 
 
The failure of the PLO to deliver, combined with their reputation for corruption, 
provided Hamas an opportunity to assert themselves during the elections in Gaza and 
gave them a surprise victory.
245
  To their dismay, the Gazans found that 
democratically electing a government did not bring international approval. Donor 
countries denied aid to Gaza because Hamas refused to recognise Israel and uphold 
previous agreements between the Gaza authorities and Israel. Israel withheld the 
collected taxation due to the authorities, and the dire economic situation within Gaza 
deteriorated further.  
 
A desperate economic and humanitarian situation arose in Gaza. With all land, sea 
and air access to and from Gaza controlled by Israel they have completely isolated the 
area. The economy, largely dependent on trade with Israel, was at a standstill in 2007 
with only about 10% of its industry in operation.
246
 
 
Hamas has increased the Qassam rocket attacks into Israel since 2005, leading to 
many punitive responses from Israel. The infrastructure of Gaza was deemed as a 
retaliatory target by the Israelis. For example, electricity and water supplies in Gaza 
were bombed by the Israeli Defence Force in 2006 in response to attacks, adding 
further disruption to daily life, and further worsening the living conditions.
247
 Gaza is 
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also dependent on Israel for half of its electricity, and for the transport of fuel through 
the checkpoints for its emergency generators.
248
 
 
According to the World Bank figures in June 2008 : 
 
Unemployment is highest in Gaza, at nearly 33% of the active work force. This 
rate is likely to become much higher as the layoffs in the industrial sector 
become permanent. . . . The percentage of Gazans who live in deep poverty has 
been steadily increasing, rising from 21.6% in 1998 to nearly 35% in 2006. . . . 
If remittances and food aid are excluded and poverty is based only on household 
income, the poverty rate in Gaza jumps to almost 67%.
249
 
  
The UN Works and Relief Agency (UNWRA) report for 2007 describes the living 
conditions: 
 
From 16 June [2007], Israel closed the borders of the Gaza Strip. . .. The drastic 
decrease in commercial foodstuffs entering the Gaza Strip resulted in higher 
prices, making it more difficult for the population to supplement UNRWA food 
rations (which provide 61 per cent of the daily caloric intake) with fruits and 
vegetables. With businesses unable to import raw materials or export 
agricultural and other products, the private sector in Gaza came near to collapse. 
An estimated 75,000 people lost their jobs, and 90 per cent of all industrial 
establishments were closed at the end of the year. The loss of livelihoods led to 
a crisis in municipalities as the fees needed to ensure services such as garbage 
collection were not paid. . . . Hospitals struggled to repair and maintain such 
life-saving hospital equipment as incubators, respirators and kidney dialysis 
machines. Several hundreds of patients sought treatment abroad every month, 
though many were denied permission to leave Gaza. . . . There were cases in 
which patients in critical condition died while waiting to exit the Gaza Strip.
250
 
 
These are extreme conditions, with an economic and humanitarian disaster imminent, 
and an oppressor force with a single objective; security, overriding all other 
humanitarian concerns.  
 
The history outlined above presents a painful and unedifying picture of almost 
continual animosity between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis for over 80 years, with 
only an occasional relaxation of hostilities. The slow but necessary building of trust 
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between the two sides is easily cancelled out by a single incident by extremists, and 
both sides then revert to the safety of hatred and vilification. The cycle of violence has 
lead to what Eyad Hallaq calls “Trauma Organized” societies, where the victim-
perpetrator  cycle becomes the normal mode of behaviour, with devastating 
psychological and social consequences.
251
 
 
Listen to psychiatrist Eyad Sarraj, as interviewed by Omar Karmi: 
 
This is a society that glorifies. Many of the suicide bombers of today are the 
children of the first intifada, who witnessed the beating of their fathers and their 
humiliation. The bottom line is that this is an expression of despair. Despair is 
expressed in the sense of impotence, despair is expressed in depression.252 
 
In this environment, a resistance organisation that can offer an alternative to despair is 
likely to attract followers. In the following section I explain how resistance 
organisations take advantage of a deeply felt humiliation to help recruit followers in 
this dire economic, social and political situation.  
 
Humiliation and the resistance organisation 
 
There are many social and  psychological forces that operate within a climate of 
oppression such as that of the Palestinians in the Gaza strip. For those whose sense of 
self-esteem is primarily based on the ability to protect and support their family, there 
is a double humiliation. Firstly they are subject to the whims and excesses of their 
oppressors. Secondly the severe economic disruption means that many cannot earn a 
living and feed their families, becoming reliant on foreign food aid. As much of this 
comes from Europe or the UN, there is the extra humiliation of being reliant on the 
charity of the institutions of the West, while rich Arab states seem reluctant to provide 
zakat, Islamic charity. 
 
Resistance organisations provide a psychological lifeline, a way to salvage self-
respect from a hopeless situation. They offer hope, identity, and a feeling of 
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empowerment to Palestinians, along with an ideology that entitles them to act out 
their frustrations The first steps in building trust are for the organisation to show that 
they actually care about the plight of the people. Hamas, the most successful 
resistance organisation in Gaza, conducts extensive social welfare activities. They 
provide food, help with housing, and organise sports and social clubs. This helps to 
spread the Islamic ideals of benevolence and self-sacrifice to areas where the poor are 
not catered for by the deteriorating and corrupt governing institutions. Over half of 
Hamas’s budget goes to social welfare: schools, libraries, mosques, orphanages and 
clinics.
253
 Having a large welfare program also helps with raising funds, as donors 
claim they are giving to a charitable cause. 
 
Within Gaza, the authority of Hamas defines the social atmosphere. Stern presents a 
few reports of what the social situation was like in Gaza during the first Intifada: 
 
Palestinians living in Gaza at the time of the first Intifada talk about the social 
pressure to participate, even for youth not living in the camps. It was just what 
everyone did, one young man told me. Interviewees in a study overseen by 
psychiatrist Jerrold Post also talked about social pressure, and the feeling that 
they would be ostracised if they didn’t participate in the violence. One said a 
friend recruited him to join Hamas, but that joining was just “the normal thing to 
do, as all young people were enlisting. With my Islamic leanings and the social 
pressure from the Islamic Center, it is only natural that I joined in Hamas 
activities in the camp”.
 254
 
 
Hamas provides the social atmosphere in which resistance is normal and expected. 
The three arms of Hamas, social welfare, political, and military provide various 
opportunities for Palestinians to take part in the struggle with varying levels of 
commitment to resistance, confrontation and violence, and provide many 
opportunities for Hamas to promote their cause. 
 
The ideology of resistance organisations provides a grand social project infused with 
noble rhetoric, an irresistible alternative to despair and depression, especially for 
impressionable teenagers. Adolescents look for ways to validate themselves and 
crystallise their personality outside the family situation.
255
 The approval of their peers 
is crucial during this stage of development, and this is where resistance organisations 
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can play a significant role. These organisations offer a noble alternative to the 
humiliations and excuses for inaction in the home environment at the time when 
developing adults are looking for ways to define themselves in the world. This is 
especially true when there are few other sources of self-esteem or ways to express 
pride in achievements. As Post reports, “the profile of a typical Palestinian suicide 
bomber is age 17-22, uneducated, unemployed, unmarried. Unformed youth”; defined 
by what they are not, not by what they are.
256
 While this analysis holds for the 
extreme case of suicide bombers, it also resonates with the profile of resistance 
fighters in general. The resistance group focuses on filling gaps, providing an 
ideology, a purpose, a livelihood and a cause.  This leads to a fusing between 
individual identity and that of the group, especially among the more radical 
individuals. The individuals appear to have no goals beyond that of the group whose 
cause they serve.
257
 The organisation’s success is the only route to individual self-
esteem. The conflation of individual and group personality and aims is described by 
Freud in his analysis of group psychology.
258
 Post also explains the psychological 
advantages of the group: “By belonging to a radical group, otherwise powerless 
individuals become powerful”.
259
 A quote from one of Post’s interviewees: 
 
An armed action proclaims that I am here, I exist, I am strong, I am in control, I 
am in the field, I am on the map.260 
 
As Post points out, this has obvious policy implications. If a terrorist’s main source of 
self-esteem arises from being a terrorist, then renouncing violence would be 
psychologically damaging.
261
 In a world of political corruption, unemployment, 
poverty and despair, the attractions of a well-funded organisation offering a purpose, 
discipline, benevolence, and a way of resolving problems is immensely attractive. 
Especially if the group’s ideology validates and reinforces the idea that the problem is 
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a “them” that can be overcome. Externalising the problem makes it possible to defeat, 
and offers hope.  
 
The resistance organisations use a sense of helpless outrage to justify acts that would 
seem to counter the well-being of the Palestinians. On the 9
th
 April 2008, fighters 
from Gaza attacked a fuel depot in Israel that was being used to supply the Gaza 
strip
262
. USA Today reports that Abu Ahmed of Islamic Jihad defended the 
deliberately targeted attack on the fuel depot on which Gazans depend. “This fuel is 
dipped in humiliation. If their fuel means humiliation for us, we don’t want it”.
263
 
Being in the position of having to accept the basic necessities of life from the enemy 
is a degradation that requires a contemptuous response, hence the attempt at 
destruction. This plays well to the sense of injured pride of some militant sections of 
the Palestinian population. 
 
When Hamas fires rockets into Israel, or organises other attacks inside Israel, there is 
usually a swift retaliation, which Hamas interprets as a new provocation, and more 
recruits become available, strengthening Hamas’s influence. This cycle of violence, 
humiliation and revenge is well described by Mahathir Mohamed, the then prime 
minister of Malaysia, in his opening address of the 10
th
 Islamic summit in 2003. The 
following is an extract from that speech (complete with its numbered paragraphs): 
 
29. Today if they want to raid our country, kill our people, destroy our villages 
and towns, there is nothing substantial that we can do. . . . 
 
30. Our only reaction is to become more and more angry. Angry people cannot 
think properly. And so we find some of our people reacting irrationally. They 
launch their own attacks, killing just about anybody including fellow Muslims 
to vent their anger and frustration. Their Governments can do nothing to stop 
them. The enemy retaliates and puts more pressure on the Governments. And 
the Governments have no choice but to give in, to accept the directions of the 
enemy, literally to give up their independence of action. 
 
31. With this their people and the ummah264 become angrier and turn against 
their own Governments. Every attempt at a peaceful solution is sabotaged by 
more indiscriminate attacks calculated to anger the enemy and prevent any 
peaceful settlement. But the attacks solve nothing. The Muslims simply get 
more oppressed. 
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32. There is a feeling of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their 
people. They feel that they can do nothing right. They believe that things can 
only get worse. The Muslims will forever be oppressed and dominated by the 
Europeans and the Jews. They will forever be poor, backward and weak. . . . 
 
33. But is it true that we should do and can do nothing for ourselves? Is it true 
that 1.3 billion people
265
 can exert no power to save themselves from the 
humiliation and oppression inflicted upon them by a much smaller enemy? Can 
they only lash back blindly in anger? Is there no other way than to ask our 
young people to blow themselves up and kill people and invite the massacre of 
more of our own people? 
266
 
 
The response to humiliation is also of prime concern to the Islamic Brotherhood, as 
stated in the ideological section of its official English version website IkhwanWeb. 
 
To confront the Western and US domination, the Muslim Brotherhood thinks 
that fighting domination requires adopting several factors, including: 
1. Spreading Islamic concepts that reject submission to humiliation, and 
incite to fighting it, and to be on to rise to support the oppressed. 267 
 
Jessica Stern also recognises the extent to which humiliation plays a role in resistance 
organisations. 
 
Halfway through my study, I asked a terrorist leader if I was getting it right. I 
laid out for him what I'd heard again and again, that terrorists were motivated by 
their perceived humiliation, relative deprivation and fear -- whether personal, 
cultural or both. I told him how this seemed to me to be what motivated 
terrorists around the world, including American ones, and that everything else 
was just sloganeering and marketing. 
 
After a silence that stretched almost to the point of discomfort, my interlocutor 
finally responded. "This is exactly right," he said. "Sometimes the deprivation is 
imagined, as in America. In Kashmir, it's real. But it doesn't really matter 
whether it's real or imagined." 
 
Holy wars take off when there is a large supply of young men who feel 
humiliated and deprived; when leaders emerge who know how to capitalize on 
those feelings; and when a segment of society is willing to fund them. They 
persist when organizations and individuals profit from them psychologically or 
financially. But they are dependent first and foremost on a deep pool of 
humiliation.
268
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Conclusion 
 
Many factors play a part in Gazan society including frustration, relative and absolute 
deprivation, unmet human needs, revenge as part of the social narrative, inability to 
resolve grievances through peaceful means, social trauma and unresolved mourning. 
Most of these factors apply to the population as a whole, and yet the vast majority of 
Palestinians in Gaza do not partake in violence. My argument is that those who feel 
humiliation the most acutely are those who will most likely resort to violence. 
Humiliation provides an emotional and psychological trigger for aggression; one that 
can convert a dire social, political or economic situation into a dangerous and violent 
one. The build-up of resentments from daily humiliations, a sense of abandonment 
and hopelessness, the breakdown of normal economic life and reliance on aid, the 
shame of being unable to provide for and protect the family, the trauma of the 
expulsion, and the accompanying entitlements of victimhood all provide a fertile 
recruiting ground for resistance organisations. While Hamas provides the organisation 
and the mechanisms for the violence to be expressed, and for it to continue, it relies 
on a growing supply of resentful and humiliated young men and women for its front 
line.  
 
Chronology of major events 
1800s Russian pogroms against the Jews caused an exodus of over two 
million Jews who fled to the US and Europe. 
1894-1906 The Dreyfus affair in France, and its accompanying anti-Semitic 
fervour, helped to promote the Zionist ideal of a Jewish homeland, 
safe from continual expulsion and mob attack. 
Early 1900s The start of Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
1917 The Balfour Declaration sanctioned a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. But the British had also promised the land to the Arabs in 
return for help in defeating the Turks. 
1930s-36 Mass Jewish migration to Palestine in order to escape Nazi 
Germany. 
1936-39 The Arab Revolt against Jewish immigration and land ownership. 
1939-45 Britain’s vacillating immigration policy turned away Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany, but at other times angered Arabs by 
allowing immigration into Palestine. Six million Jews, one third of 
the Jewish population, killed in the Holocaust in Europe. 
1948 Establishment of the state of Israel. Expulsion of 600,000 
Palestinians. Atrocities of Yeir Dassin and Kfar Etzion on both 
sides. Arab states declare war, which Israel wins. Expulsion of 
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400,000 Jews from Arab lands. 
1964 Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to rid 
Palestine of the Jews. 
1967 Crushing Israeli defeat of the surrounding Arab states in the six day 
war. 300,000 more Palestinians flee the West Bank and Gaza. 
Israel occupies the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights. 
The Arab states reject a land for peace offer at the Khartoum 
Conference, with “No peace, no recognition, no negotiation”. 
1970 The PLO expelled by force from Jordan, forms a new base in 
Southern Lebanon. 
1973 Yom Kippur War with Syria and Egypt. Heavy losses on both 
sides, but the attack eventually repulsed. Arab honour restored, and 
the myth of Israel invincibility exposed. 
1978 Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Palestinian problem 
downplayed. 
1982 Israel invades Lebanon to drive out the PLO. Sabra and Chatilla 
massacre in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli army stay in Lebanon 
for 18 years. 
1987-1992 First intifada erupts in Occupied Territories.  
1991 PLO supports Iraq during the first Iraq war, weakening their 
position in the Arab world. 
1993 The Oslo accord. Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza city and other 
urban areas. The accords have since collapsed with angry 
recriminations on both sides. 
1994 Massacre of 30 Arabs in a mosque by Baruch Goldstein. Peace 
treaty between Jordan and Israel downplays the Palestinian 
problem. 
2000 Israel leaves Lebanon after many years of harassment by 
Hezbollah. 
2000-05 The second intifada is met by severe reprisals by the Israelis. 
2002 Israel begins construction of the security barrier enclosing the West 
Bank. 
2005 The Sharm-el-Sheik agreement lead to the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from Gaza, and the evacuation of settlements there.  
2006 Hamas wins elections in Gaza, and has international sanctions 
imposed upon it. 
2006 Hezbollah capture Israeli soldiers, and Israel retaliates with an 
attack on southern Lebanon. Hezbollah resists and Israel 
withdraws, leaving the situation unresolved. 
2006-8 Hamas intensifies rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel. Israeli 
punitive measures include destruction of Gaza infrastructure, and 
declaration of Gaza as ‘hostile entity’. 
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Conclusion 
 
There are many cases and classes of political violence that do not necessarily involve 
extreme resentment felt as humiliation. The violent overthrow of a government may 
have its underlying roots in social grievance, resulting in righteous anger, without 
requiring a sense of degradation. Wars may be fought over resources, or justified by 
security considerations, with the emotional element playing only a minor part. I have 
argued in this thesis, however, that examining the emotions at work, especially those 
associated with extreme degradation and humiliation, can help understand conflicts 
that defy conventional analysis, such as the ongoing destructive cycle of violence 
which characterises the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
In Chapter 1 I investigated the extent to which theories of collective violence take into 
account the role of humiliation. A theory that describes the relationship between 
humiliation and violence must consider both the humiliating situation and the 
emotional or psychological reaction to that situation. The review outlined the four 
main psychoanalytical theoretical strands that discuss the origins of violence. Firstly, 
the dispositional view emphasises the personality, upbringing and innate tendencies of 
the individual, and by extension, of group and mob psychology to help explain violent 
episodes. Secondly, the frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard that has been 
built on by others helps to explain group violence in the face of social grievances, 
unmet demands or perceived injustices. The third strand emphasises the role of the 
social dynamics within the group. This can manifest as a higher authority demanding 
abusive behaviour as in Milgram’s experiment, or hiding behind the anonymity of a 
group while sadistic behaviour is implicitly sanctioned, as in the Zimbardo prison 
experiment. However, a discussion of the role of humiliation in violence must 
consider both the situation, as well as the emotional reaction to that situation, and so 
must combine the situational and dispositional view of violence. This fourth 
psychosocial view, as exemplified by Volkan, illustrates how a social trauma can 
become part of a group’s identity, and how the need for resolution, often through 
revenge, can be passed down the generations. I have built on these ideas, and by 
including some cultural factors have developed a model for assessing the role that 
humiliation plays in instigating violence.  
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In the introduction I asked some questions about how humiliation and violence are 
linked. The answers to those questions provides the basis for the model I have 
developed. 
 
What is the nature of humiliation? 
 
Humiliation is one of many negative self-conscious emotions. In general usage it can 
have a range of meanings from embarrassment, exposure of inadequacy, or public 
shame. In order to clarify the discussion, I have defined humiliation in its collective 
sense as being the emotion associated with being treated in a degrading way. In its 
extreme form it is associated with complete loss of control, in that an oppressor can 
deny natural justice, enforce petty rules or even inflict atrocities. I have shown how 
humiliation can act as a type of emotional multiplier. Whenever a negative emotion is 
coupled with a sense of being devalued or degraded, the emotion is strengthened. I 
draw on Coleman’s work that shows that the emotion of humiliation is not dissipated 
on recall (unlike fear or anger), so the emotional impact of a past event remains strong 
over time. Humiliation can turn indignation to fury, a sense of loss to obsession, 
injustice to vengeance, and insult to retribution. 
 
When do a humiliated people resort to violence? 
 
I have argued that if humiliation is expressed as a demeaning control over a group of 
people, then the basic human need for self-determination can become an overriding 
force leading to violence. This type of humiliated fury can have a strong expressive 
element in that it is mainly concerned with washing away the shame of helplessness. 
People need to display to their oppressors, and to themselves, that they are still a force 
to be reckoned with, and not being treated with respect will have consequences. These 
emotional forces can be strong enough to override practical concerns of effective 
targeting or timing, and in extreme situations can resemble a group running amok. 
 
If humiliation is part of a group’s social or historical trauma, then, as Volkan has 
shown, the trauma will echo throughout the group’s psyche. Whenever the group is 
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threatened, or its sense of identity is in danger, the past trauma re-emerges as a strong 
social force, and takes centre stage. A leader, or the elite, can combine this sense of a 
past wrong that needs avenging with a sense of victimhood that entitles revenge. If 
this is associated with Mack’s description of demonising the enemy as less than 
human, then violence is a likely result. 
 
Also, Macnair points out a type of negative feedback loop in operation that is difficult 
to break. When an oppressor uses humiliation and harsh treatment to break the will of 
the resistance, the humiliation itself helps stoke further violence. This proves to the 
oppressor that the deterrent needs to be stronger to be effective, and there are 
retaliatory strikes. This deepens the pool of resentment among the resistance, and the 
cycle of violence continues. 
 
Why do perpetrators of violence use humiliation as a 
weapon? 
 
The use of humiliation as a form of violence against an enemy is complex. At one 
level, demonstrating complete control over the enemy through the use of arbitrary or 
unjustified punishment or hardship can be a weapon to break morale and displays the 
futility of resistance. Committing atrocities against an opponent shows that the 
perpetrators have complete control over the other’s situation, and there is nothing the 
other can do about it. This humiliation is often justified by demonising the enemy, 
which, as Moses points out, makes us feel more pure and righteous. 
 
At a deeper psychological level, as Volkan explains, externalising bad traits and 
characteristics onto an enemy promotes a greater sense of self-worth; we are 
combating evil, and also justifies denying the enemy any freedom of action, as 
compassion or even human decency is wasted on those driven by evil designs. The act 
of humiliating the enemy is in itself proof that good can overcome bad, and that we 
are safe from evil. 
 
Once a people have been humiliated, the nature of their response is likely also to be in 
the form of humiliation, for two related reasons. Frijda shows that victims want 
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retributive justice expressed as lex talionis, a type of equality of suffering. Those who 
have been wronged feel most satisfied with the retribution when it matches the crime. 
It is a type of indirect acknowledgement from the other of knowing how it feels. So a 
humiliated people will tend to react by humiliating their oppressors so they can know 
what it feels like. 
 
The second reason is related to the nature of humiliation itself. Being humiliated by an 
oppressor means that freedom of action has been taken away. One way of refuting 
this, and proving to yourself and the other that you have not lost control over your 
own situation, is to humiliate the oppressor in return. It may take some time, even 
decades or generations, between the initial humiliation and its response, as the group 
may need time to build the confidence and strength to retaliate.  
 
How do cultural factors affect the link between humiliation 
and violence? 
 
I have argued that different cultural attitudes to insult and perceived weakness have 
developed through the necessities of security and status.  
 
In collective societies group loyalty plays an important role in social behaviour, and 
any insult to the individual is regarded as an insult to the group as a whole. In such 
societies the opinion of others is highly important, and one’s status in society largely 
depends on how others regard your behaviour. The ability to defend one’s honour is 
necessary to build a strong social network. Any insult or slight must be met with an 
aggressive response to show that you are not a person to be trifled with. In such a 
society, humiliations must be reversed, and defence of honour is regarded almost as 
an obligation. 
 
Those cultures that traditionally have a weak central authority to impose law and 
order develop security and defence mechanisms built on fierceness of reputation and 
contacts with powerful friends. The credible threat of violence guarantees security and 
status. Those societies in which the awareness of threat is a dominant behaviour 
pattern I have labelled “security cultures” to differentiate them from the more 
The Role of Humiliation in Collective Political Violence.  Bibliography 
108 of 118 
collective honour cultures.  Societies that have developed from this tradition still have 
remnants of this way of thinking built into social behaviour. To insult someone invites 
an aggressive response, as an insult is a challenge to reputation and status.  
 
Conflicts in which a people are oppressed and have little control over their destiny are 
especially humiliating for those cultures in which the ability to assert power, control 
and influence is an integral part of social acceptance and respect. The respect that is 
earned by the ability to defend property and family against threat by others is negated 
by the destruction of homes and villages, and especially by rape. Even though such 
actions may be part of a deliberate ploy to destroy the morale of the enemy, the 
resulting humiliation may well present a real future danger to the oppressor 
 
In individualistic societies revenge tends not to be so socially sanctioned. The social 
experiments described in Chapter 3 show that members of honour-based societies 
become angry more readily in response to insult than do members of more 
individualistic societies. 
 
The importance of mourning 
 
While researching humiliation, I have unexpectedly come to understand that there are 
many parallels between unresolved mourning and group trauma. The mourning 
process is necessary to come to terms with the loss of self-esteem through 
humiliation. Unfortunately it is difficult to resolve the mourning process when 
humiliation adds emotional intensity and an immediacy to the loss. The symptoms of 
chronic mourning, such as obsession with the loss, unrealistically assigning blame, 
and the inability to move on, are also present in some group trauma.  
 
If a group suffering humiliating within a conflict situation trauma experiences the 
social or political conditions to come to terms with their loss, in other words to mourn 
properly and then start building a future, then the need for revenge may dissipate over 
time. If, however, they are continually reminded of their loss and there is little 
acknowledgement of their plight, then the mourning is less likely to be resolved, and 
the need for revenge can become an obsessive and driving force in their lives. 
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My research suggests that we could apply some lessons from dealing with personal 
mourning to how groups cope with humiliating losses in order to avoid violent 
responses in future. 
 
Modelling the role of humiliation in collective political 
violence. 
 
Summarising the findings of my research leads to a model that helps predict the role 
humiliation plays in driving a people to react violently against its situation. The 
stronger the following factors, the more likely humiliation plays a significant role: 
• Social and political control is imposed by others. 
• This control is expressed in ways that feel degrading, such as the denial of 
natural justice, or a sense of powerlessness. 
• Many individuals have direct experience of oppression (e.g. arbitrary arrest, 
beatings, or even a discriminatory bureaucracy). 
• A significant and dramatic (or even traumatic) change to a less privileged 
social or political position is part of the social narrative, and the change is 
regarded as undeserved. 
• The use of physical force is a culturally acceptable method of gaining self-
esteem and/or the respect of others. 
 
Not only does there need to be a situation that is degrading, but also that there are 
social mores that permit violence as a reaction against the humiliation. This may help 
to explain how it is that only some members of the population resort to violence. 
Young men may feel humiliation more keenly, and this, combined with the pride 
associated with defending the group’s honour, can lead to a need for revenge.  
 
The Gaza case study shows how a resistance organisation can harness this felt need 
for revenge by providing an environment of hope, action and self-respect rather than 
hopelessness and depression in response to ongoing humiliation. With few other 
means of building self-respect available, the resistance organisation provides the 
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dominant social narrative and a sense of cohesion and purpose for an otherwise 
despairing youth. 
 
Those involved in military strategy need to be more aware of the emotional and 
psychological effect of their campaigns. When campaigns have a humiliating effect, 
even if unintentionally, there will usually be long-term complications. For example, 
on the 27
th
 of October 2008, four American helicopters attacked a village on the 
Syrian side of the Iraqi / Syrian border, killing eight people. Two days later, the 
following poll question was put to visitors of the AlJazeera website. “Do you feel 
humiliated by the American attack on Syria?”. Of the 21,493 respondents, 83% 
confirmed that they did.
269
 As far as the AlJazeera readership is concerned, this is one 
more incident where they feel humiliated by their helplessness in the face of 
aggression. I doubt whether the American military considered the incremental effect 
this raid would have on the pool of resentment that their terrorist foes rely upon for 
recruitment. 
 
Humiliation plays a significant but often hidden role in collective violence. It can eat 
away at self-respect before being expressed in either a coldly calculated revenge, or 
an uncontrolled fury. The corrosive nature of humiliation means that it can easily 
override the better and more pragmatic instincts of politicians, the military, and most 
importantly, young men in general. It is a dark worm that can remain hidden in the 
group psyche for decades, even passing down the generations, before being awakened 
to justify terrible revenge.  
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